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The relationship between the United States and Europe has gone through a period of unprecedented strain under the two-term tenure of US President George W. Bush. His Administration's instinctive preference for unilateral action and readiness to resort to pre-emptive use of force have proven to be highly controversial, to the point that European Union governments have struggled to find a balance between their traditional support for Washington and their resolve to keep unity within the EU. The US security paradigm shift from territorial defence to protection against asymmetrical threats has impacted profoundly on the transatlantic relationship and US and European leaders have not been able to manage the transformation process in a consistent way. A frank, open and in-depth debate on the distinct US and European security priorities is still needed. This publication is meant as a contribution to such a debate.

# RE-LAUNCHING THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

edited by Riccardo Alcaro



Quaderni IAI

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# PREFACE

The relationship between the United States and Europe has undergone a period of unprecedented strain under the two-term tenure of US president George W. Bush. Some of the policies championed by his Administration, most notably its advocacy of unilateral, pre-emptive use of force, have shaken the European Union's internal cohesion. Considerable sections of the public have lost trust in the US and the EU governments have sometimes been unable to reconcile their traditional support for Washington with their resolve to keep unity within the EU.

While US foreign policy in the last eight years has largely been shaped by the president's and his staff's peculiar views of America and its role in the world, it has also reflected the attempt to adjust to a changed international scenario. The US security paradigm has shifted from territorial defense to protection against asymmetrical threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This has inevitably led to a transformation in the transatlantic relationship historically founded upon the territorial protection of the North Atlantic area. Unfortunately, US and European leaders have been unable thus far to manage such process of transformation in a consistent way, partly due to the lack of a clear strategic direction shared on both shores of the Atlantic. A frank, open, and in-depth debate on what divide the transatlantic partners and what unite them as far as their security is concerned is still needed, particularly at a time when the upcoming change of presidency in the US will open up a new opportunity to re-new dialogue on reciprocal needs and priorities.

The present Quaderno IAI is the final outcome of a research project – labeled “Transatlantic Security Symposium” – aimed at fostering such an

exchange of views. This general objective breaks down into two strictly intertwined sub-goals: identify the underlying dynamics of change in the transatlantic security relationship, possibly distinguishing between structural factors and those which can be traced back to political choices and contingencies; and, drawing on these analyses, elaborate a set of policy proposals for re-launching co-operation between the two shores of the Atlantic (and within the European Union itself) on a more solid basis.

The Transatlantic Security Symposium has been conceived as a regular annual event for European and American researchers to present and articulate analyses of various aspects of the transatlantic security relationship before an audience of experts and officials from both the United States and Europe. The papers collected in this publication are longer, revised versions of the drafts presented and discussed at the first edition of the Symposium, which was held in Rome on May 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup>, 2008. They are complemented by a set of policy recommendations worked out drawing on what emerged during the meeting. A detailed report of the conference is added in the appendix.

The Transatlantic Security Symposium featured lively and intense debates, with opinions varying significantly almost on all topics touched upon. These included several issues ranking high on the transatlantic security agenda: the ability (or inability) of the transatlantic partners to adjust to the post-Cold War international scenario in a coordinated manner; the future of NATO and its relationship with the European Union's embryonic defense dimension; when and how to undertake crisis management operations; the perceived need to re-frame, at least partially, the context of the fight against terrorism; how to improve coordination when dealing with highly sensitive issues, such as relations with Russia or the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, so as to prevent tendencies to free-ride; political and technical problems related to the transatlantic trade in defense products.

Both American and European participants in the Symposium expressed their conviction that better transatlantic cooperation in the security field is in the vital interest of the US and Europe – the latter meaning both individual countries and the European Union. Indeed, several, if not all, experts argued that shaping a functional transatlantic security and defense partnership is so important as to be considered a strategic imperative.

In spite of this shared assumption, however, the debate recorded more divergences than convergences. This is not to say that discussions held at the Symposium were somehow inconclusive. Indeed, the debate held at the



conference served as a valuable feedback for authors to make changes to the original texts. Furthermore, margins for improving transatlantic cooperation could be discerned even amidst the substantial differences of opinions. Such common ground elements constitute the basis for the set of policy recommendations included in this volume. The proposals relate to the Symposium's debate in that they cover only issues that were actually brought up there. They do not reflect opinions expressed by participants (if not incidentally), nor have they been worked out on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The recommendations are the result of independent elaboration of the topics discussed. Though linked to the debate, therefore, they are meant to stand autonomously and are presented in this volume accordingly.

R.A.



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# 9. WHERE TO (RE)START? PROPOSALS FOR RE-LAUNCHING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP IN VIEW OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

*Riccardo Alcaro\**

## **1. Introduction**

In the research world, in the academy, and among officials and even politicians, the notion that the end of the Cold War has irreversibly transformed the nature of the transatlantic alliance from an ‘alliance of necessity’ into an ‘alliance of choice’ has become all too common.

The disappearance of such a tangible military threat as the one embodied by Soviet tanks (and nuclear warheads), so the argument goes, has greatly reduced Europe’s strategic importance for the US (which will eventually turn its eye away from the Atlantic towards the Pacific); lessened European dependence on US military protection; and removed the glue that kept together the US and its European partners even when their positions on issues of international concern were different. Moreover, the rise of the United States to an unprecedented level of global ascendancy, thanks to its unrivaled military might, economic prowess, technological superiority, and cultural dominance, has nourished anxieties, as well as prejudices, in Europe that the US might regard its European allies as mere executors of its foreign policy goals rather than autonomous partners. The eight years of the Bush Jr. presidency have all but reinforced this perception.

\* Giovanni Gasparini, co-director of IAI research program on NATO and ESDP, contributed to the elaboration of the recommendations related to transatlantic cooperation in the defense industry.

At the same time, however, the majority of international observers, as well as many leaders on both shores of the Atlantic, increasingly acknowledge that the transnational character of most of the newly emerged threats (terrorism, illicit transfer of WMDs) and challenges (climate change, economic imbalances, energy security, mass migrations) requires broad coalitions of like-minded states to be effectively addressed. No single country, even as powerful as the United States, has the capability to take on such complex and often inter-related tasks by itself. Close international cooperation is needed. For both the US and European countries the first and foremost international interlocutor still lies across the Atlantic, when it comes to forging durable and effective solutions to the major problems besetting the world today. They can rely on a military alliance centered on the (so far unchallenged) principle of collective defense, massive flows of trade and investment, and well-established societal contacts in the fields of tourism, education, research, etc. It is on these grounds that the 'alliance of necessity' can actually evolve into the 'alliance of choice' advocated by many.

Indeed, the need to counter the emerging threats and challenges are strong reasons for the United States and European countries to keep their special relationship alive. A closer look into what binds them, however, seems to suggest that putting their relationship into the framework of an 'alliance of choice' might be misleading. The notion of a military alliance is at the same time too deep and too narrow to capture the dynamics underlying the evolution of the security relationship between the US and Europe. Too deep because a military alliance lacking a tangible existential threat inevitably loses part of its luster. Too narrow because territorial defense, which still constitutes the cornerstone of NATO's existence, is only a fraction of the broad panorama in which transatlantic security cooperation now takes place. A wider array of instruments than military assets, namely closer cooperation among judiciaries, police and other law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services, are increasingly being employed to cope with the newly emerged threats.

Furthermore, the shared US and European interest in preventing the geopolitical changes resulting from the dissolution of the Cold War international system from jeopardizing their security calls for a creative, flexible, but above all coordinated diplomacy. This is most evident when at stake are regional issues with global ramifications like the controversy over Iran's nuclear program. But a steady effort to coordinate diplomatic approaches should also be made when it comes to relations with such new powers as

China, India, and a resurgent Russia. In stark contrast to the time when they had to deal with the Soviet Union, the United States and Europe may now have diverging priorities to promote and defend in Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow. Americans and Europeans need to upgrade existing consultation mechanisms or establish new ones.

The absence of a tangible military threat has removed a clearly identifiable common objective (defeat of the enemy) and slackened the transatlantic sense of solidarity and mutual dependence – all typical traits of an alliance. At the same time, the transnational, multifaceted character of the newly emerged threats and challenges have led the US and its European partners to expand enormously the scope of cooperation. The strong logic behind intensifying consultation and coordinating policies makes the transatlantic consensus more a matter ‘of necessity’ – in the sense that it is the result of the most rational political calculation – than ‘of choice’ – as if there were other equivalent alternatives. On this basis, it seems more correct to explain the peculiar security relationship between the US and Europe as a ‘partnership of necessity’ rather than an ‘alliance of choice’.

Following is a set of policy proposals for re-launching the transatlantic security partnership according to this conceptual framework. The recommendations draw from the discussions held during the “Transatlantic Security Symposium 2008”, the international conference upon which this volume is based. As mentioned in the preface, the following proposals relate to the Symposium in that they cover only the issues that were discussed there. They are nonetheless the result of independent elaboration and are meant to stand autonomously.

## **2. The future of transatlantic security cooperation**

The change of leadership in Washington after the 2008 presidential elections will offer the United States and its European partners the chance to explore new options for cooperation in dealing with issues of international concern. Indeed, US and European commitments to strengthening the transatlantic relationship by devising shared strategies and carrying out coordinated policies will face a crucial test.

- Opinion- and decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic should rid themselves of the interpretational cliché according to which enhanced transatlantic cooperation will almost naturally occur after Bush’s exit.
- A long overdue, frank and in-depth debate on the specific security needs

and priorities of the US and European countries should be opened immediately at the highest level since the problems in transatlantic cooperation of the past years, however exacerbated by the controversial policies of the Bush Administration, reflect important differences in security interests and priorities. Such a debate would also serve the purpose of dispelling the misleading assumptions that, with Bush gone, Europeans will have no excuse to resist calls from Washington to increase their military commitments (in particular by sending more troops to Afghanistan), or that Americans will turn into enthusiastic multilateralists.

- Differences should be frankly spelled out rather than downplayed or, conversely, over-emphasized. The fact that Western allies have different interests or may pursue the same interest with different intensity has to be fully accepted. Experience shows that coordinated policies that take these asymmetries into account have proven to be less divisive and more effective (as is the case in the Balkans where different priorities between the US and Europeans have been translated into a coordinated strategy, constructively arrived at, which takes such differences into account). This is a necessary step to prevent the US and European countries from free-riding on such issues as the nuclear standoff with Iran or the relationship with Russia.

### **3. NATO and US and European roles in crisis management**

In recent years, NATO has seen its appeal diminish in some, mainly western, European countries, which fear that the organization is being turned into an instrument of US foreign policy. At the same time, the US stance on the EU's efforts to develop an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has vacillated between tacitly adversarial (ESDP seen as an attempt to decouple from NATO) and openly skeptical (EU's credentials as an effective military actor questioned). In fact, what these trends reflect is a lack of shared vision on the future of the Atlantic Alliance and its relationship with the European Union, rather than deliberate calculations on the part of the US or European countries on NATO and ESDP. In spite of the difficulties facing the transatlantic relationship, no European member of the Alliance seems to put into question NATO's role as main provider of Europe's security; nor do the Alliance's decision-making mechanisms leave individual European members opposed to US-championed measures without means to resist them.

- The United States should re-affirm its commitment to NATO as the principal forum in which strategies and responses to crises affecting the Euro-Atlantic area and/or interests are discussed and agreed upon. The Europeans should match this commitment by showing more readiness to draw on their military resources when needed. The operation in Afghanistan provides a fitting test case for such reciprocal commitments: European NATO members which keep their troops from engaging in combat operations are justified in doing so if they do not entirely share the manner in which ISAF is being conducted and would like a greater say on the matter; less so, if troops are withheld out of concern that their deployment would alienate skeptical public opinions at home.
- The US should refrain from openly advocating such controversial measures as offering membership prospects to problematic countries like Georgia and/or Ukraine, given the reluctance of several European countries to irritate Russia with initiatives they regard as premature, and the more general uncertainty surrounding the mid- and long-term implications of an ever expanding NATO. The Europeans, for their part, should put forward proposals outlining the political criteria for accepting would-be members in order to make a constructive contribution to the enlargement debate.
- The ongoing debate on the revised NATO Strategic Concept, to be adopted at the summit marking the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Washington Treaty, should include a section on crisis management operations. Although defense of the Euro-Atlantic area should remain the core pillar of the Alliance, the political objectives underlying out-of-area operations, as well as how and when to embark on them, should be clearly spelled out. The goal is to avoid the many improvisations, the costs of which NATO is now paying in Afghanistan.
- With the aim of strengthening European military capabilities and US and EU crisis management capacity, the United States should drop its opposition/skepticism with regard to ESDP and support its development and integration with NATO activities. Insofar as ESDP coincides with EU members' efforts to rationalize and maximize their defense resources, it is the most plausible alternative for improving EU capabilities to the unlikely increase in military expenditures that the US has long and unsuccessfully been asking the Europeans for.
- Cooperation between NATO and the EU should be given renewed and special attention. A well-functioning partnership between the two organ-

izations would meet three important requirements: 1) foster European cohesion within NATO, thereby strengthening transatlantic support for NATO activities (the idea of establishing an informal 'EU caucus' within NATO should be explored); 2) equip the transatlantic partners with a diversified and comprehensive tool box for crisis management by integrating NATO's military assets with the EU's civilian and civilian-military capabilities; 3) avoid costly duplication and competition of military assets, as is the case with the EU and NATO rapid reaction forces – the EU Battle Groups and NATO Response Force, respectively – which compete for the same skilled personnel and advanced equipment.

- The debate on crisis management should not be limited to capabilities. It should include the definition of political criteria spelling out the conditions under which stability-oriented operations should be undertaken. Here, as elsewhere, the Americans and the Europeans can draw relevant lessons from the experience in Afghanistan. Much emphasis is put on capabilities – the debate revolves mainly around European reluctance to commit (more) equipment and troops for combat operations and the need to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization efforts with counterinsurgency activities – while inadequate attention is devoted to the political solution to the crisis. Events on the ground apparently attest to the fact that the 'Bonn compact' is no longer viable, and new options for the post-crisis status should be examined. The bottom line is that crisis *management* should always be undertaken as part of a broader crisis *solution* endeavor.

#### **4. How to re-frame the context of the fight against terrorism**

International terrorism rooted in radical Islam is perceived as a major threat in both the US and Europe. Commonalities, however, do not go far beyond the shared assumption that counterterrorism should consequently be a top priority. The US and European countries differ substantially on how to tackle the terrorist menace. A shared threat perception therefore needs to be reconciled with shared threat assessment and response.

- The distinctive features of the terrorist menace need to be fully explained. The expression 'international terrorism' does not identify an enemy, rather a typology of threat. Its peculiar aspects are: its roots in a radically politicized Islam; its vague political objectives (even though larger organizations such as the original al-Qaeda do seem to have a political agenda);



its resort to destructive, potentially catastrophic, means; its non-hierarchical, network-centered structure, which can even include isolated, self-sufficient groups with only loose contacts with similar groups or organizations; its global range (al-Qaeda-like terrorist cells can autonomously organize and operate in such diverse areas as the US, Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf region, South Asia and Southeast Asia); its regenerating capacity.

- The United States should abandon the 'war model' that has so far inspired its 'global war on terror'. This approach has many shortcomings and has proved controversial and, arguably, counterproductive. Not only does the notion of 'war' lead to over-reliance on military might, it also nourishes a climate of ideological clash which contributes to entrenching an al-Qaeda-like terrorist 'culture' in communities susceptible to radicalization (including communities of Muslim immigrants).
- The US should embrace, upgrade and develop the model which has guided the European holistic approach to counterterrorism: coordinated use of repressive, judicial and intelligence instruments; intensification of multilateral cooperation, including intelligence sharing, in particular at EU, EU-US, NATO, and UN level; action to prevent, not only tackle, radicalization and recruitment of would-be terrorists.
- The US and the EU should address the following issues head on: the ideological appeal of al-Qaeda-like international terrorism for individuals who often do not have much in common in terms of national origin, personal experience, social status, education; the capacity to inspire the creation of autonomous cells, most notably in Muslim immigrant communities; recruitment procedures; communication strategies; common operational practices; potential collusion with other groups with which opportunistic partnerships can be established.
- Differences within international terrorism should be clearly spelled out in order to devise appropriate responses to specific forms of Islamic terrorism. The US and the EU should refrain from establishing, also indirectly, links between al-Qaeda-like, radical Sunni groups and groups/parties defined entirely by a national/territorial dimension. Not only is pooling together al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan's radical Islamist groups, the Iranian government, Hezbollah, Hamas, terrorist Palestinian groups operating in both the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, Sunni groups and/or cells active in North Africa, Central Asia or Europe analytically incorrect, it undermines chances to gain larger support for the fight against Islamist-

rooted terrorism where it counts most, that is, in Arab and Muslim countries; and hampers the elaboration and implementation of sound counterterrorism measures. The EU has a strong interest in keeping its efforts to hunt terrorists removed from misleading politicization, which stokes resentment within communities of Muslim immigrants and facilitates the creation of home-grown terrorist cells.

- The use of force should be limited, selective, and auxiliary. It should be limited to specific conditions and actions, for instance targeted strikes against terrorist sanctuaries in areas where control of territory is either in hostile hands or non-existent.
- The rule of law should be fully upheld and used as a propaganda instrument to pinpoint the fundamental differences in principles and methods between liberal democracies and radical Islamic terrorist groups which condemn liberal democratic values and combat western interests. The Guantanamo prison camp should be closed; Abu Ghraib-like cases should be denounced much more loudly and the people responsible for abuses prosecuted with no indulgence; highly controversial measures such as extraordinary renditions should be terminated; waterboarding and other practices which can be regarded as torture or inhuman treatment should be prohibited. Security measures which infringe civil liberties (such as the right to privacy) should be debated openly by parliamentary assemblies and not decided by governments behind closed doors; they should also be subject to regular review processes.
- Defense of the rule of law in national jurisdictions should be accompanied by determined efforts to re-build and consolidate broad international support for the fight against terrorism, aimed in particular at sensitive and symbolically important targets like Arab and Central Asian states (where, however, recovery of western credibility is bound to be a difficult and medium-term process) and countries in Southeast Asia with Muslim majorities or considerable Islamic minorities (where public opinions are less impermeable to sound American and European initiatives of public diplomacy). To this end, the UN and other multilateral institutions, including the International Criminal Court, should be given a higher profile role in the fight against international terrorism.

## 5. Avoiding free-riding: the cases of Russia and Iran

### 5.1 *Relations with Russia*

The troubled relations of the US and Europe with Russia are a revealing testimony of how different priorities can facilitate ‘free-rider’ tendencies and impact negatively on transatlantic cooperation. How to frame the relationship with Moscow should be high on the agenda of the in-depth transatlantic dialogue recommended above, as differences in security priorities and economic and energy needs have reduced the margins for US-EU convergence.

- The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008<sup>1</sup> is a litmus test for the transatlantic partners to show cohesion vis-à-vis the Russians. The key point should be to make it clear to Moscow that its military action in Georgia would reinforce US-European resolve to keep unity and would not remain without consequences. The US and the Europeans should embark on a joint diplomatic campaign aimed at persuading the Russians to return to the military positions held before the conflict erupted, and to accept an international, preferably UN-led, mediation. The US and its European partners should make it clear that the August war has not vanquished Georgia’s chance to accede NATO. But the transatlantic partners should not rush. The Georgian government should be pressed not to take provocative decisions and to abide by a rigid conduct of prudence and consultations with NATO states (not only the US). It is hard to imagine that Georgia may eventually join NATO pending the twin conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For the time being, more realistic options than Georgia’s membership should be envisaged. NATO countries should explore the possibility to offer Georgia agreements ensuring political and military support, while the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be discussed within the framework of a truly international mediation forum.
- The United States and European countries should intensify preliminary consultations on measures that could be perceived as provocative by the Russians. If talks at NATO and EU level had preceded the missile shield

<sup>1</sup> The Russian-Georgian war took place on August 8-13, 2008, and was obviously not discussed in the Transatlantic Security Symposium, which was held on 12-13 May, 2008. The suggested recommendations, however, take into account arguments that were made during the debate at the conference to the extent they are still relevant to the changed situation.

agreement between the US and the Polish and Czech governments, and if the US and the Europeans had waged a diplomatic campaign aimed preliminarily at assuaging Russia's concerns, it would have been possible to avoid some of the most negative consequences of the worsening of relations with Russia, notably Moscow's suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Mutual trust between the US and its European partners would also have benefited from timely consultations. The open divisions over the opportunity to give Georgia and Ukraine clear prospects for future NATO membership are another reminder that Americans and Europeans have to consult before taking decisions affecting their relations with Russia.

- The United States should urge EU members to redouble efforts to reach a consensus on how to deal with Moscow, especially regarding energy policies. Washington should encourage the Europeans to accord preference to EU-wide energy initiatives over national undertakings which can prove detrimental to EU's unity vis-à-vis Russia.

### *5.2 The nuclear standoff with Iran*

How to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions will remain a challenging test for the ability of the US and Europe to coordinate and implement effective policies. The US and the Europeans should agree upon their main objective once and for all: is it to undermine Iran's clerical regime through isolation and sanctions with a view to changing it or to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities?

- The priority right now should be to obtain verifiable guarantees from Iran that its nuclear program has no military applications, though promoting respect of human rights and progress on political liberties in Iran should remain an important goal to be pursued on a separate track.
- The current strategy based on a limited set of sanctions as well as an equally limited offer for dialogue and cooperation should be strengthened and upgraded with the full participation of the United States in the European-Iranian talks. This should be accompanied by the injection of a degree of flexibility in the negotiating strategy. In particular, the possibility of having direct talks before and not after the complete suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program should be seriously considered.
- The US and the EU should get ready for the worst. First, they should preventively clinch a deal with Russia and China which would bind all UN

Security Council permanent members to endorse a much tougher set of sanctions, should International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors be unable to clarify all ambiguities surrounding Iran's alleged military nuclear activities (which are illegal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a party as a non-nuclear state). Second, they should further pursue Iran's regional isolation by offering limited but certain security guarantees to the Arab Gulf states, as well as by favoring a thaw in relations between Israel and its Arab rivals (Syria first, then Lebanon and the Palestinians).

- These containment measures should go hand in hand with negotiation efforts, so as to make it clear to the Iranians what risk they would be heading towards if they were to opt for going nuclear, while leaving the door open for a mutually satisfactory solution. Containment measures would also make it unnecessary for the US to evoke continuously the specter of a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. The US does not need to repeat in public time and again what the Iranians already know – that the Americans would not refrain from resorting to the use of force, should they think it is in their national interest to do so. But constant saber-rattling only makes it more difficult for the US and the Iranians (and for the Europeans also, who are caught in the middle) to open a constructive dialogue. Such inflammatory rhetoric contributes to polarizing public opinions in both Iran and the US, with the consequence that policy-makers on both sides would find it increasingly hard to sell to the public the unavoidable compromises that a diplomatic solution would imply.
- US-European efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions would receive a boost from a renewed transatlantic push to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime as such. The US should unequivocally reject the notion that the NPT is dead letter and strongly commit to its full implementation. The US and the EU should unite in upgrading existing proposals and formulating new ones to address the treaty's major loopholes – the verification gap, the absence of automatic mechanisms to punish non-compliance, and the risks inherent in the dual-use nature of nuclear technologies. The transatlantic partners should also work toward meeting the long-standing concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon states, for instance by taking steps toward reducing nuclear arsenals, banning nuclear tests (via ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and securing/reining in global stockpiles of fissile material. While working on the strengthening of the multi-lateral norm, the US and the EU should remain committed to further

developing and expanding such extra-NPT measures as export controls and interdiction of nuclear smuggling. Finally, the US and Europe should come up with some creative ideas on how to bring the nuclear powers that have not signed the NPT into the non-proliferation regime, principally by extracting verifiable guarantees from them that their exports of nuclear technology and materials strictly abide by non-proliferation standards.

## **6. Defense industry cooperation**

Cooperation in the sector of defense products is a highly sensitive issue, strongly intertwined with national security concerns as well as with the debate on opening up highly regulated sectors of the economy.

- The US and the EU should embrace the idea of a 'Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base' as a key instrument for upgrading technological resources; improving the ability to coordinate and interoperate in military terms; and tightening economic and political links between the two shores of the Atlantic.
- Rather than trying to achieve an impossible balance between US and European defense markets, given the substantial disparity in resources (the US outspends the Europeans by a large margin), the general aim of this process should be to broaden access to respective markets.
- The US and the EU should refrain from politicizing transatlantic contrasts in the defense sector so as to dispel the prejudice of an unavoidable trade-off between deeper market integration and national security.
- The US should favor deeper integration of European defense markets. Not only would resource concentration, procurement centralization etc. boost European military capabilities (especially in R&D), it would also offer the US more solid guarantees against European protectionist measures (which are easier to adopt at national than at the EU level). The EU should consequently integrate its defense markets so as to avoid the reverse effect of a 'fortress Europe'.
- The US should push for transferring the bulk of large contract negotiations from bilateral to EU level. In particular, procurement procedures should be guaranteed through comprehensive, versus bilateral, deals.
- The US and the EU should adopt measures aimed at cutting costly red tapes, thus reducing the bureaucratic burden on defense companies. In particular, a less stringent application of provisos included in the ITAR regime should be encouraged.

## 7. Conclusion

Although relations between the US and Europe recovered relatively quickly from the deepest lows experienced during the Iraq crisis, these improvements seem to hinge more on tactics than on strategies and, more importantly, are for the most part confined to government level. Large sections of the public, especially the European public, remain more estranged than ever towards the transatlantic partner. Controversial political choices (principally the decision to go to war against Iraq), as well as security priorities that no longer dovetail so substantially, have contributed to driving a wedge between the two shores of the Atlantic. On top of that, US and European societies are undergoing a process of transformation that may eventually end up with the two being more distant than they currently are. As pointed out in Leon Fuerth's chapter, the fading memories of common struggles during World War II and the Cold War; the growing proportion of US citizens originally coming from places other than Europe; the risk of an ageing Europe becoming more inward-looking as it struggles to preserve the sustainability of its increasingly costly welfare systems and integrating fast-growing Muslim immigrant communities; America's sense of 'exceptionalism' in a world that globalization makes ever more interdependent; the US' persistent temptation to go it alone in foreign affairs, so distant from the EU's consolidated preference for multilateral solutions; in the long run, these and other related factors are set to weigh heavily on the endurance of the transatlantic relationship.

American and European opinion- and policy-makers, therefore, carry the special responsibility not only to work out ways to strengthen cooperation, but also to convey a credible defense of the utility, and ultimately the necessity, of a strong transatlantic security partnership to their respective public opinions.

Even though no immediate threat to the territories of Europe is in sight, the uncertainty over future predicaments makes it much of a gamble for the Europeans to end the military alliance with the US, in spite of all the obligations it involves. The United States provides the European countries, with the partial exception of the nuclear powers UK and France, with a level of protection that they are unable to ensure unless they significantly increase their defense expenditures. Even if they had to take this unlikely (though desirable) path, decades of limited investment in defense products and technologies would inevitably produce lower defense standards compared with the US ones. Furthermore, Europe's security (as pointed out in

the EU Security Strategy) increasingly depends on the ability of EU member states to intervene in strategically important areas to prevent conflicts; manage crises and its consequences (rise in migration flows; increased criminal activities; political radicalization of immigrant communities; etc.); and defuse international tensions. A transformed military is an essential means to meet these ambitious objectives. The EU members have made remarkable efforts to pool together financial resources, assets, and personnel to increase their capacity to intervene abroad. Close cooperation with the United States – be it to ensure US political and/or financial support, to get its assistance in the planning and operational phases, or to share the military burden with it – is a key factor in making the EU's crisis management efforts more effective.

More generally, Europe needs the US when it comes to dealing with major issues of global concern. The fight against terrorism has benefited greatly from the structured collaboration between law enforcement, intelligence, and other technical agencies; WMD proliferation regimes can hold only if international coalitions of influential states, such as both the US and European countries, constantly promote their upgrading and strengthening; the EU's resolve to combat climate change will remain empty unless the US joins in the effort; securing energy supplies, a big concern for the Europeans, requires coordinated policies at both the European and transatlantic level toward exporting countries; reforms aiming to streamline and reinforce multilateral institutions, most notably the United Nations, cannot be achieved without a substantial American contribution; and the list goes on and on.

Europe's room for maneuver on the world stage is more likely to expand through strong partnership with the United States than by drifting apart from Washington. Some EU states that has long acted on this belief, most notably the UK, have interpreted it in the sense that the relationship with the US should be accorded preference over the one with the European Union. Others, above all France, have occasionally cultivated the hope that a more integrated EU would eventually allow them to build an alternative pole to the US. Recent history has proven both assumptions short-sighted. Pooling resources at the EU level is increasingly seen by European elites as an essential part of their security, be it by coordinating environmental, energy or immigration policies, forging common non-proliferation and counterterrorism approaches, or developing crises management capabilities in order to stabilize Europe's neighborhood or other critical regions. In many, if not



all, of these policy areas, well-structured cooperation with the US could work as a multiplier of the EU's effectiveness. Thus, for European countries, the EU and the US represent a double ring of protection of their security. There is no unavoidable tradeoff between strengthening the first ring (the EU) and the second (the partnership with the US). On the contrary, a policy aimed at reinforcing EU cohesion while tightening links with Washington could generate a virtuous circle which would greatly benefit Europe's security. The Cold War adage by which European integration and a strong relationship with the US actually go hand in hand (a principle that has long informed the foreign policies of countries like Germany and Italy) can be adapted to the present situation.

The Americans, on their part, should be reminded more often of the following. For the time being, but also for the foreseeable future, no partnership other than the one with Europe – meant as both the EU and its individual members – presents the US with the same security advantages in terms of tackling asymmetrical threats (where closer international cooperation is often more useful than high-tech combat units); carrying out complex diplomatic actions aimed at defusing dangerous crises, with Europe taking the lead when necessary, as in the case of the nuclear standoff with Iran; preserving US influence and prestige through broad, genuine European participation in US-led initiatives; ensuring more legitimacy and longer sustainability to military operations such as the one in Afghanistan. More generally, Americans should pay more attention to the fact that, though less evidently than in the past, the historical, cultural, and political proximity between Europe and the United States still makes the Europeans by far the most reliable long-term partners.

A stronger Europe, that is, a more united and capable EU, is in the interest of the US. Fears that a more united EU could become a sort of a federal entity able to act as a rival or competitor to the US are greatly exaggerated.

To begin with, individual EU states are set to retain sovereign powers in foreign policy for a long time (if not forever) – which will prevent the EU from systematically 'counterbalancing' the US power.

Moreover, when individual EU states do agree upon a foreign policy strategy, they are inclined to seek US support; and if Washington is opposed, as was the case for a while in the dispute with Iran, they see no advantage in openly confronting it and tend to play down tensions instead. Actually, disagreements are more likely to escalate into open rifts when the EU is divided than when it is united, as attested to by the controversy over Iraq.

Finally, the US needs to realize fully that the 'unipolar moment', if it ever existed, is over, due to both the inability of a single country to face the present challenges and threats alone and the rise of new powers like China, India and Russia. The US will have to undertake diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions with those countries, preserve its security by effectively fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation, embark on costly and complex crisis management operations, manage the consequences of economic imbalances, climate change, energy supplies, etc. Needless to say, all these gargantuan tasks demand partners, such as Europe, with which to share the political and economic responsibility, as well as the military burden. Therefore, Washington should welcome progress in European integration, including in the defense area. Greater EU defense capabilities would make the Europeans more willing and able to cooperate with the US, including at the military level, in crisis management operations, while reducing the cost for the US to defend Europe. True, this may eventually result in the EU taking on a more proactive role in international affairs and partially limiting US predominance. But for the US losing part of its ascendancy in favor of a reliable partner could be an acceptable price to pay if that same partner accepts to take over a substantially greater share of the political and economic burdens associated with common foreign policy endeavors.

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# APPENDIX



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# TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2008: CONFERENCE REPORT

*Emiliano Alessandri*

## **1. Introduction**

In an effort to promote dialogue, cooperation, and reciprocal understanding between the United States and Europe, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome, in cooperation with the Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Washington D.C., and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) of Paris, organized a symposium with a focus on transatlantic security. This was conceived as just the first of a series of similar meetings to be held yearly on the same topic. This year, the Transatlantic Symposium concentrated on four main issues: the future of the Euro-Atlantic security relationship; the evolution of crisis management operations; counter-terrorism strategies; defense industry and transatlantic relations.

The event was sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF-US), the Friedrich Erbert Stiftung, Rome Office, the Compagnia di San Paolo of Turin, and the Italian Ministry of Defense. The meeting took place in Rome on May 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup>. It was hosted by CASD in Palazzo Salvati, Piazza della Rovere 83, Rome. The list of participants (see, attachment) included well known foreign policy experts, internationally respected scholars, and distinguished practitioners and officials, among whom the Italian Chief of Joint Staff.

This report provides a summary of the discussion which developed around the four main issues dealt with during the Symposium and advances a set of policy recommendations based on the results of the meeting.

## 2. Sessions

### 2.1 *The Future of the Transatlantic Security Relationship*

*Leon Fuerth's* paper speculates upon the future of the transatlantic partnership by identifying and assessing the impact of the major transformations that occurred after the watershed of 1989. Among the factors having a negative, or potentially negative, effect on transatlantic security, the paper includes: the fading of experiences and memories which bound the generations of Americans and Europeans who cooperated during World War II and the Cold War age; demographic trends, in particular: Europe's aging and diminishing populations who are struggling to absorb fast-growing numbers of outsiders (many of whom illegal) and are engaged with managing the growth of Muslim communities; America's changing "melting pot", featuring ever growing Hispanic and Asian minorities which do not look at Europe as America's "old country"; America's declining economic power due to internal mismanagement and expensive and failed policies (the invasion and occupation of Iraq). The paper also emphasizes the new global challenges: the rise of other international actors, chief among them China; dislocations brought about by the globalizing economy; the accumulation of huge financial surpluses at the disposal of state-run sovereign funds; networked international terrorism and crime; religious fanaticism; global climate change.

Recommendations follow, among which, the further consolidation of executive European institutions for the purpose of more coherent US-European responses to common challenges; the return of the US to multilateral practices; the strengthening of transatlantic institutions (e.g., the endowment of NATO with financial authority of its own and the replacement of consensus with majority vote, the creation of a US-European "economic union"). More in general, the point is made that the trans-Atlantic system no longer suffices for managing international threats and challenges and that the destiny of American and European nations now depends on what they can collectively bring to the larger community of nations in terms of both resources and principles (that is, liberal economic and political values).

*Bruno Tertrais'* paper deals with specific issues affecting transatlantic security, notably deterrence, non-proliferation and missile defense. The paper makes the point that, despite several strategic divergences, the post-Sept 11 environment is still marked by a common transatlantic outlook on threat perceptions, as evidenced, among others, by the Comprehensive Political Guidance issued at the 2006 NATO Riga Summit.

As for non-proliferation, the paper contends that Iran is the central test for transatlantic security cooperation. The paper suggests that the next US president should make it clear that the US seeks a change in “regime behavior” as opposed to regime change. This would assuage European fears of a new war. It is also essential that the US government reassert its commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The paper underlines that the majority of Europeans are against missile defense sites in Europe, whereas Americans are split on the issue. The paper also emphasizes that Russia’s opposition has had resonance within the West. The paper contends that missile defense serves the interests of both the US and Europe and that Western allies should cooperate with each other as well as engage with Russia.

The paper notes that the US, UK and France have similar approaches concerning nuclear deterrence, although the UK seems more interested in pushing the disarmament agenda than the other two. For their part, the other NATO members complain about the lack of progress in disarmament.

The paper notes, lastly, that an interesting conjuncture of events is appearing on the horizon. The next NPT Review Conference is scheduled for 2010 and non-nuclear NATO members will want stronger commitments on disarmament to ensure the continuation of the treaty’s validity and legitimacy. In 2011-13, the construction of missile defense sites in Europe is due to be finished. The completion of the missile defense program could lead NATO nuclear powers and other NATO nations hosting nuclear weapons on their territories to make concessions in the field of disarmament, including considering the removal of NATO tactical nuclear weapons from Europe’s non nuclear states. This could provide the basis of a new consensus within the Alliance on nuclear matters.

**The challenges to transatlantic security are several, real, and need fresh solutions.** Participants lively discussed and commented the papers and generally agreed that the challenges to transatlantic security as identified by the authors are very real, although with varying degrees of emphasis. They also agreed that fresh and creative efforts have to be made to cope with the many challenges facing Western nations without being trapped in past concepts, paradigms, and policies. A participant summarized this hope in the formula: “not reconstructing the past, but shaping the future”.

**But Americans and Europeans often disagree on how to meet them.** As to how to meet the challenges to transatlantic security, however, divisions pre-

veiled. Despite various important exceptions, broadly speaking, a divide seemed to separate American participants on the one side and Europeans on the other.

Criticism on the part of Americans generally concentrated on Europe's "free-ridership" in transatlantic security, its unwillingness to invest more in common defense, and its self-delusional expectations about the prospects of EU integration, especially in the foreign policy, security, and defense fields. European participants, on their part, noted that the EU has still to be fully credited by the US government as a key, let alone equal, international actor, even though it has been able to strengthen its role, power, and influence.

There was widespread recognition among both Americans and Europeans that the election of a new US president in November 2008 is likely to have an overall positive impact on transatlantic cooperation. This did not prevent the discussion from addressing several controversial issues. Accusations which have recurred since at least 2001, such as the depiction of American foreign policy as militaristic and often unilateralist and of European foreign policy as either non-existent/irrelevant, or when existent and relevant, informed by transatlantic balancing logics, were heard during this discussion as well as the rest of the Symposium. A participant stressed that, when it comes to security and defense policy, the idea of a US-EU relationship is somewhat misleading. He argued that EU members' full authority on foreign policy matters would make it more appropriate to talk of a system of separate, though certainly connected, bilateral relationships between the US and the European countries, rather than a single partnership between two equal entities. When expressed, however, these opinions were generally laid out constructively. The need for stronger transatlantic ties was reaffirmed by all participants.

Acknowledging the existence of various sources of division, most participants concluded that after the US presidential elections, both European and American views and claims will be more easily tested: Europeans will verify if America's distrust for multilateralism and its militaristic interpretation of foreign policy were episodic and peculiar to the Bush Administration or if, on the contrary, these orientations are shared also by the rest of the American political establishment; Americans, on their part, underlined that after Bush leaves the White House, Europeans will have no further excuses to refrain from actively cooperating with the US in the campaign against international terrorism and in the management of major international crises.



**Iran and Russia are the two great tests for future transatlantic cooperation.**

Although the situation in Afghanistan was commented upon by several participants, consensus gathered around the observation that both Iran and Russia raise critical, although different, challenges to transatlantic security and are going to be the two main tests for transatlantic cooperation. Agreement stopped with the recognition that transatlantic cooperation would be preferable to transatlantic disagreement or lack of coordination when dealing with these two countries. In fact, divisions emerged as to both the interpretation of the challenge, and the means to meet it.

An American participant pointed out that no diplomats in Europe have clearly explained how Iran can be deterred, if the military option is ruled out. Another American participant disagreed with the opinion expressed by a European scholar that what Iran wants to obtain is just security and international recognition of its regional role. Some Americans voiced the concern that Europe might be “free-riding” on Iran, knowing that the US will do whatever is needed to deter it, with or without the help of Europe. A European participant acknowledged that Iran has more ambitious objectives than international recognition and security but pointed out that this does not mean that it is bound to build a nuclear arsenal: a common transatlantic strategy aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without frustrating its national ambitions is pursuable.

Participants generally agreed that Russia’s new rise as energy power is seen with more preoccupation in the United States, where the democratic record of Russian politics is looked at with growing worries, than in Europe. A European participant mentioned data showing that Germans seem to be more favorably inclined to Russia than to America. It was remarked that the US adopted very confrontational tones towards Russia during the NATO Bucharest Summit. A participant noted in this regard that Europe needs to have Russia as a partner and hence cannot afford being confrontational. Another participant contended that, in fact, neither Europe nor the US have a strategy to cope with Russia and that both are dangerously “free-riding” on the issue.

Some participants commented on China being a challenge to transatlantic security. A participant noted that growing numbers of Europeans look at China as a potential threat, whereas this was true mostly for Americans until recently. Another participant voiced concern about China’s penetration of African economies.

**Iran also highlights divisions over anti-proliferation strategies.** Discussion of the Iranian issue led many participants to deal extensively with the issue of nuclear proliferation and anti-proliferation strategies. Even here, disagreement was substantial. An American participant cut it short: the NPT is close to being dead letter and when it works, it allows proliferation rather than preventing it. North Korea has already pulled out whereas India is operating outside it. Several Europeans insisted instead on reforming the NPT and on its validity. A European participant rebuked the argument that the NPT is dead letter by stressing that it has in fact worked: without it, we would live in a nuclear world. On the other hand, a participant noted that even a reviewed – more effective – NPT regime is unlikely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

**NATO's future is very uncertain.** There was a general recognition that NATO's future remains uncertain, as a result of both systemic changes after the Cold War and the problems it has encountered in some areas of intervention, notably in Afghanistan. Nobody suggested that NATO be dismantled, but several participants underlined that its appeal among Western nations has substantially decreased. The invocation of article 5 after Sept 11 was not followed by a real renaissance of the organization role. Some European participants proposed that NATO become a subsection of US-EU cooperation, with the EU assuming greater capabilities and security responsibilities. An American participant noted that if NATO is in Afghanistan, it is because Europe wanted it. Another American participant welcomed EU claims for a greater role in defense and security but stressed that this should not lead to the downgrading of NATO as a transatlantic security organization. Others suggested that both NATO and the EU need reform and that perhaps brand new institutions should be created. There were invitations to go beyond the old dichotomy of EU and NATO and think creatively about the subject. Another participant suggested looking at NATO as a "club": it will have a future only so long as it provides net benefits for its members.

## *2.2 The Evolution of Crisis Management Operations*

*James Dobbins'* paper compares UN, NATO, and EU experiences with nation building with the purpose of both assessing the crisis management record of each of these international actors and drawing useful lessons for transatlantic cooperation. Its starting point is that nation building has

become the dominant paradigm for post-Cold War military interventions. Despite this centrality, however, limited efforts have been made to date to transform lessons from past missions into new policies and instruments for future ones.

The paper argues that the UN scores best in all principal yardsticks for gauging success, such as enhanced security, economic growth, return of refugees, and installation of representative governments in the countries where intervention has taken place. This is because, it is explained, such operations are among UN's lead products: UN missions can draw on long institutional experience; civilian and military chains of command are integrated and so are civilian and military capabilities; finally, authority is firmly in the hands of the UN Secretary-General, at least until the following Security Council review (held every six months).

The paper argues that the Atlantic Alliance has the most powerful military forces to offer to such expeditions, but completely lacks capacity to implement civilian operations: it currently depends on the UN and the EU to perform such tasks. NATO's consensus-based decision making, moreover, exposes missions to the ever present risk of veto by national governments, which have an important voice in operational matters. The EU, on its part, seems to have the most developed array of crisis management-related civilian capabilities and skills, but its decisions are based on consensus, like NATO, and its military forces are much leaner than NATO's, on which it often relies.

The paper concludes that transatlantic cooperation would greatly benefit from both US and EU re-engagement with UN missions (most of them are carried out today by mostly non-Western contingents), as well as from a reform of both NATO and EU nation-building institutional and political set-ups. Afghanistan is a case in point: NATO lacks the civilian assets it would need, the EU could step in but it would not be enough, and the UN could probably provide the best alternative source of civilian leadership but currently is not doing so.

*Tom Valasek's* paper concentrates on the evolution of EU missions, noting that they have significantly grown in number and become more efficient and successful. At the same time, however, the paper shows that the EU's self-styled "comprehensive approach" to crisis management is still not a reality in many important respects: military power and the hardest diplomatic tasks remain firmly in the hands of national capitals; the EU Council and the EU Commission often cooperate poorly and sometimes even start

separate missions in crisis areas; the EU Commission often works in separation from the EU's top diplomats in the country where the mission takes place; EU civilian and military agencies are not fully integrated. The paper shows that in all these issues, some progress has been made since the EU first embarked on crisis management, although frustration remains, in particular as to the level of available military capabilities. Among the most notable changes, the Macedonia case shows that duplication can be avoided: there, the EU's special representative, who reports to the EU Council, also serves as the head of the Delegation of the EU Commission. This approach, it was explained, seems to look at the US model which relies on strong local envoys, like presidential envoy Paul Bremmer in post-intervention Iraq. The paper argues that, however important, this and other reforms of EU crisis management will remain limited because national capitals want to retain some form of direct control over these operations and are therefore reluctant to delegate decision-making power to EU's crisis management bodies. This is not a bad thing in itself, it was argued, because, in fact, important improvements of EU crisis management capacity can take place at the national level too. In the specific case of coordination between civilian and military components of crisis management, for instance, the paper suggests that EU operations would greatly benefit from stronger efforts on the part of national governments to institute common approaches to crisis management between the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, interior and development, as is already the case in the UK, for instance. Beside improving its own instruments, the EU could support this process by setting up a small EU advisory team with the task of traveling to EU capitals and imparting to national governments the lessons learned in civil-military cooperation from ESDP missions.

**There is no single and established model of nation building.** Participants commented on the various suggestions and proposals contained in the papers. The idea of an "EU advisory group", in particular, was widely debated. Some found it useful, others insisted that the UN remains the most valuable source of advice in the field of crisis management. Most participants agreed, moreover, that the problem is broader and deeper and has to do with the lack of a true model for nation-building against which to decide on what kind of reform is needed both at the EU and transatlantic levels. This was not seen, by some at least, as a completely solvable problem. It was noted, in fact, that national and international crises often differ substantial-

ly and, therefore, require different missions. The other side of the coin is that countries, even at the transatlantic level, often prioritize crises differently and this problem too is never going to be completely solved. In this regard, a participant pointed out that “free-riding” on certain missions at the transatlantic level is not only legitimate and understandable, but also wise if the intervention not only lies outside the perimeter of a country’s national interests but is also carried out according to what is seen as a fallacious strategy. It was noted, moreover, that unlike traditional defense, crisis management operations are seldom vital to the participating countries’ national interests: a certain degree of uncertainty as to whether enough political will can be found to start the operation and as to whether the contributing countries will confirm their commitment even in the face of escalation dynamics seems, therefore, unavoidable.

**The EU has had a growing role in crisis management.** It was agreed that the lack of an established model of nation building has not prevented the EU from improving both its capacity and record in crisis management. Growing demands for crisis management have been met by growing commitments on the part of the EU. It was recognized, moreover, that the lack of adequate NATO civilian capabilities puts the EU’s greater and continuously evolving ones at the center of any future transatlantic security cooperation. It was also noted that, although currently in need of clear standards to follow, the EU is developing a model of its own by learning from experience. A participant argued that this bottom-up process could potentially be more successful than imposing reform from above; the missions in Congo and Chad seem to be particularly telling in this respect for the many lessons that they offer. Many acknowledged, furthermore, that the Lisbon Treaty envisaged important elements of reform, at least to solve some of the existing bureaucratic problems: the new EU High Representative will also serve as the EU Commission’s Vice President – a step towards greater integration; the establishment of a EU diplomatic service, moreover, should discourage duplication. It was noted, finally, that France’s imminent presidency of the EU could give a boost to further reform in crisis management, given French president Sarkozy’s commitment to promoting progress on ESDP, and his more general commitment to investing greater resources in defense and security, at both the EU and NATO levels.

**But much remains to be done.** All American participants, but also most European participants, recognized that the EU's legitimate crisis management and nation-building aspirations are far from being fulfilled, despite encouraging signs of progress. Deployability is a major problem. When and how to deploy troops, and how many, are issues that often cause divisions between European countries. Consensus gathered around the observation that EU Battle Groups are currently too small for the missions they might be called upon to perform. A participant, however, noted that establishing the size of such contingents in advance is questionable, the risk being of creating instruments and then waiting for crises to suit them: the right approach would actually go the other way around. It was pointed out, moreover, that the costs of missions have been deliberately underestimated. Some noted that the reluctance on the part of EU governments to increase their defense budgets means that greater investment in crisis management often translates into cuts in other chapters of expenditure, such as traditional defense and personnel. In this connection, several European participants noted that resources for crisis management would be enough even at the current level of defense budgets, the problem being rather the pooling of national resources and redistribution of budgets according to both considerations of efficiency and changing priorities. In this regard, crisis management should become one of the central items of a country's security basket. The point was made that a more open European defense market would translate into a better allocation of resources and in arguably faster and greater technological progress. A participant noted that the US has a clear, although often neglected interest, in a further pooling and rationalization of European resources for security and defense because this would allow Washington to rely more on its European partners, even if the budgets are not increased. To be true, most participants agreed that, however pressed by the US, EU governments are unlikely to increase their defense budgets to the levels that would satisfy current US demands, the best alternative probably lying both in deeper integration of European budgets and in a more efficient allocation of existing resources at both the national and EU levels.

**NATO's crisis management capacity has its problems too, as evidenced by Afghanistan.** Most participants agreed with the argument made in the papers that NATO has the largest military capabilities for crisis management at the transatlantic level. It was noted, however, that capabilities do

not, in themselves, constitute a guarantee of success. Some participants pointed out that the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was deliberately established for operations requiring fast deployment of NATO troops also beyond the borders of Europe, has seldom been employed. A participant reminded that, due to French opposition, NRF was not employed on the Pakistani-Afghan border. It was also noted that NRF presents perhaps the opposite problem of EU Battle Groups: it is oversized for most tasks it was conceived for. Capabilities, moreover, seem unable in themselves to assure victory in Afghanistan where not only NATO's crisis management capacity, but its relevance too, are being tested. Most Americans pointed at the disproportion between American and European contributions to the stabilization of Afghanistan while Europeans argued that the problem is more about the political strategy than about the lack of adequate military capabilities. An American participant contended that NATO would not be in Afghanistan today if Europeans had not insisted on this as a way of giving greater legitimacy to the mission and preventing the US from having total control over its management and developments. The Europeans, it was argued, should feel obliged to give tangible proof of their commitment to a NATO mission that they themselves advocated, even if this requires more troops, money, and casualties. An American participant admitted that NATO's mission in Afghanistan is currently a "counter-insurgency" rather than a crisis management mission, the situation on the ground having worsened substantially in the past year. A German participant noted that in an election year, German political leaders will never commit to higher budgets for a mission that is already looked upon with skepticism all across Europe. Several participants stressed that what is needed at the transatlantic level is not an agreement on technical issues only, but a political understanding on nation building at large, that is a common view of what political objectives ultimately guide such a complex task. According to a participant this would mean deciding what the ultimate goal in Afghanistan is to be: what kind of stabilization, what kind of Afghanistan Europeans and Americans have in mind. In this connection, it was noted that NATO's 60 anniversary in 2009 could open a window of opportunity for reaching, or at least starting to build, consensus at the transatlantic level on a new and long overdue "Strategic Concept". The latter could more clearly define the Alliance's role in crisis management, while also addressing other major problems such as the size and exact functions of NRF, the civilian capabilities of NATO, etc.

### 2.3 Counter-terrorism Strategies

*Ian Shapiro's* paper argues that much can be learned from transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War, starting with "containment". The central claim of the paper is precisely that containment can be a successful strategy to counter international terrorism and stabilize the international system after the many crises of the past few years.

Containment is interpreted as a strategy that differentiates between threats and establishes limits to military commitments abroad. There are several references in the paper to Kennan's own considerations, in particular as to the imperative for the US to avoid embarking on military interventions abroad when vital interests are not at stake: enemies, on their part, will have vital stakes once targeted, and will fight until the end, and perhaps more successfully. Kennan's teachings are considered useful also in connection with the need to keep potential and actual enemies divided: the opposite of what the Bush Administration did when lumping America's rivals together under the label of "Axis of Evil".

The paper argues, moreover, that in a globalizing world, containment has to rely on more than during the Cold War on international action and regional participation. The latter means, when it comes to the Middle East, engaging with Syria and Iran. An analogy is drawn between today's Iran and yesterday's China: containment is needed, but strategic opening should complement it. Regional participation, it is pointed out, should also lead to reinforcing, or building afresh, regional alliances, the goal being to have NATO-like organizations in all the hot regions of the world. As to the need for international action, the paper argues that international authorization is crucial in two main respects: normative reasons make it important to provide legitimacy for international action, especially when war is waged, so as to prevent the formation of balancing coalitions uniting against what would be seen as an "imperial America" and an imperialistic West; the involvement of international organizations, such as the UN, moreover, proves a great addition to missions in weak or failed states because of the precious information that these institutions can rely on and offer other organizations on the ground.

*Paul Wilkinson's* paper argues that what distinguishes Americans from Europeans is not threat assessment (both agree, for instance, that Al Qaeda is the most dangerous terrorist movement facing the international community), but the preferred approach to deal with the terrorist menace. The Bush Administration, it was recalled, decided to declare a "war on terror"



after Sept 11. This choice, the paper argues, was understandable given the tragic figures (death toll, casualties toll) of the 2001 terrorist attacks, but it was nevertheless a choice based on a grossly simplified picture of the nature of terrorism which led many to assume that the US military would be able to solve the terrorist problem by defeating Al Qaeda on battle fields through its military superiority. Europeans, on the contrary, eschewed a militaristic interpretation of the campaign against terrorism by stressing a holistic approach to the struggle and giving a central role to police and judicial means (pursuing, bringing to trial, and convicting the terrorists). The paper contends that the latter approach is superior in consideration of the lessons that can already be drawn from the case of Iraq as well as from the experiences of the Israelis in their struggles with Hezbollah and Hamas: 1. there is no purely military solution to a serious terrorist campaign; 2. overdependence on the military provides terrorists with powerful propaganda and recruitment weapons besides visible and fresh targets, and is therefore counterproductive. The paper concludes that the experience with Iraq in particular testifies to the limitations of unilateralism and calls for a return to a multilateral strategy. New counter-terrorism policies, it is stressed, shall in the future be firmly anchored to respect for the rule of law and human rights: the West cannot ignore its own proclaimed human rights and rule-of-law principles if it wants to win the battle of ideas that is part and parcel of the fight against international terrorism.

**“Containment” of terrorism and respect for human rights and the rule of law both acknowledged as important arguments.** Discussants debated the central claims of the two papers and most concluded that the idea of “containing” terrorism is an interesting and promising concept, especially in the light of the failure of the all-out war against Al Qaeda of the past eight years. A participant noted, however, that Cold War containment turned out to be a fairly expensive policy and that efforts should be made to reduce the costs of a containment strategy if applied to counter-terrorism. Many agreed, moreover, that Al Qaeda is different from previous terrorist groups in that it seems to lack any clear political agenda: it is, therefore, very difficult if not impossible to “discourage” it from resorting to violence by identifying a political pathway along which some of its claims could be given recognition. Discussion also covered topics such as the use of torture during interrogations, the question of extraordinary renditions, and the transformation of national security, both as a concept and as a set of institutions,

in response to international terrorism. Consensus gathered around the concept that Western democracies have to live up to their principles, the rule of law and human rights in particular, both when fighting terrorism and when creating new domestic instruments to protect their own citizens from external danger. In this connection, some participants criticized “renditions” as often involving patent violations of human rights and as instruments undermining instead of strengthening transatlantic cooperation.

**But views diverged as to how to interpret both “containment”...** It was noted that, while both papers stressed the need for international authorization and collective action to counter terrorism, containment of the terrorist threat was conceived differently. The American view of containment, drawing on the experience with Cold War containment, seemed to be inspired by a largely militaristic interpretation of the terrorist threat, whereby wars are waged against it, although strict criteria are set as to when and against whom to use international force. The European view of containment seemed to focus instead on policing and judicial means to stem the spread of terrorism, the underlying assumption being that terrorist groups are often integrated within societies and cannot be completely defeated on battlegrounds. Some European participants noted that, containment, as outlined in Ian Shapiro’s paper, did not envisage any clear role for the EU. An American participant suggested that a division of labor could contemplate NATO undertaking most of the defense as well as fighting duties, and the EU offering its civilian, intelligence, and crisis management skills. On the specific issue of containing Iran, a participant noted that strategic opening requires the goodwill of both sides, and Iran is unwilling at the moment to open any such dialogue. It was also pointed out that the strategic equation of the region is very complex and that a regional alliance against terrorism could have many different shapes: it is not always easy to translate the principle of regional cooperation into actual policies. A participant insisted, however, that substantial reasons exist to engage Iran because both the US and Teheran share common interests: they both oppose the return of the Taleban in Afghanistan, and would be damaged by a collapse of Iraq and by the unmanageable refugee problem that this would probably create.

**...and international legitimacy.** As for international legitimacy, it was noted that the very notion of self defense has significantly expanded after the end

of the Cold War and particularly in connection with the threat posed by terrorism, so that it is now difficult to establish what its limits are. A participant stressed that pre-emption is not in keeping with international law, at the moment, no matter how self defense is defined. Discussion then moved on to how to build international legitimacy. Many participants stressed the need for UN Security Council authorization, but some expressed doubts that the UN, as it is, is suited for the task, starting with the composition of the Security Council. It was pointed out that, while to some extent marginalized in the fight against terrorism, the UN has offered an important forum in which the US and Europe can cooperate on anti-terrorism. The UN Security Council, for instance, has passed several resolutions against terrorism. Resolutions 1540 and 1573 in particular have addressed the issue, the former setting up a committee which may also provide intelligence to countries lacking capabilities. A participant noted that the UN can be bypassed, if needed, as long as transatlantic security cooperation against terrorism respects international law.

**Sharing intelligence is crucial and so is reciprocity.** Consensus gathered around the observation that intelligence is key to the defeat of terrorism. It was noted that both the EU and the US have made significant progress towards updating and reforming their intelligence assets. The US, on its part, is coping with the downscaling of intelligence following the end of the Cold War. It was stressed that during the Cold War, anti-terrorism was a prerogative of the CIA, whereas after 2001 a new multi-agency institution was created which has the potential to be more effective, although different approaches among the various agencies can sometimes lead to confusion. As to the EU, progress has been made through the “European Action Plan” against terrorism, but the problem of inadequate coordination persists. It was also pointed out that majority voting in the EU’s “third pillar” should lead to further progress in Europol/Eurojust instruments. Some participants noted that European countries still have different counter-terrorism cultures and for these reasons are sometimes reluctant to proceed with integration of services. It was noted, lastly, that transatlantic cooperation has been fairly effective against terrorism financing, although often carried out bilaterally or through small or ad hoc groups of American and European countries. One participant argued, and others concurred, that full reciprocity is lacking in transatlantic counter-terrorism, with the US accessing European intelligence, but jealously guarding its own.

#### *2.4 Defense Industry and Transatlantic Relations*

*Christine Fisher's* paper starts with the observation that defense is not a normal market: there will always be "complexities" due to the fact that defense is inextricably connected with sovereignty and national security. The paper argues that the US does have an interest in a real transatlantic defense industrial base, even though sensitivity about technology export and attention to foreign acquisitions made in the US have notably increased after 2001. The paper then passes on to discuss the current situation and contends that the fact that the US defense industry sells more to Europe than the US buys in return does not necessarily mean that the European market is more open and accessible. Among the obstacles impeding American firms from penetrating the European market, the paper distinguishes between barriers that are erected by EU member states and those erected within the US ("self-imposed barriers"). The former include non-competitive contracts, national preferences and national favorites; ownership and limits on foreign investment; barriers to protect national technology, industrial jobs and intellectual property. The paper concludes that many of the barriers that European nations have set up against US firms are similar to those that European firms face in accessing the US market. It also stresses that those barriers vary, however, by degree and intensity not only between the US and Europe, but also within Europe.

As to self-imposed barriers, the paper focuses on ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations). It notes that ITAR reviews and enforcements are becoming so unpredictable and time consuming that products from the US with an ITAR string are less desirable in Europe ("ITAR-tainted"). Another self-imposed barrier has to do with culture: the successful history of US defense products has sometimes led to disregard for national needs in foreign markets.

The paper analyses, lastly, the possible impact of prospective new pieces of EU legislation such as the EC Defense Directives Package, which calls for a more competitive European Defense Industry, a Procurement Directive to govern buying, and a Transfers Directive for export coordination within the EU Community. This new legislative package poses, according to Fisher, new concerns for US market access in the EU. The risk is two-fold: first, that an Euro-centric vision will prevail; and second that the new directives will inadvertently create new barriers. It is not clear to date whether this new framework will translate into higher barriers or not; what the US government and industry in any case strongly recommend, is to pay increasing

attention to the implications of the new rules regulating the EU market. *Andrew D. James'* paper, offers a similar analytical exercise, but applied to the US market. The paper addresses the question of whether the transatlantic arms market is a "one-way street", that is, if it is characterized by a European market that is comparatively much more open and accessible to US companies and technologies than the US market is for European firms. It shows that recent developments testify to a greater presence of European companies in the US market and to a growing number of them winning high profile contracts from the US Department of Defense and other government agencies. A notable example is the decision of the US Air Force to purchase tanker aircraft from an Airbus-Northrop Grumman consortium (a contract worth US \$40 million). After examining other developments of this kind, the paper concludes that these encouraging signs are still not enough to claim the end of the one-way street. The contract with Airbus-Northrop Grumman, for example, has engendered a storm of political protest in the US Congress and prompted Boeing to refer the procurement to the US Government Accountability Office. Senators Clinton and Obama, now in the race for the White House, argued that the Boeing loss was just the latest example of policies resulting in US jobs being shipped offshore. The paper also notes that a substantial imbalance in transatlantic arms trade remains, although this reflects to some extent an imbalance in transatlantic investment and procurement as well as R&D. Moreover, the paper notes that European companies tend to "follow the market", meaning that the direction of flows within the transatlantic arms market reflects the fact that the US market is still much larger than the European one. The paper concludes that the scenario to be avoided is the rise of a "fortress Europe" protecting its own defense industry instead of demanding greater openness from the US.

**Defense markets are not "normal" markets and will hardly become so in the future.** Discussants lively debated the papers and recognized that, although rather technical, this session of the Symposium was nonetheless central to the understanding of transatlantic security and could provide the basis for interesting political considerations. Most participants agreed that defense markets are not "normal" markets and are, in fact, the last bastion of protectionism: defense is national security at its core. Most discussants confirmed, moreover, that Sept 11 has added new complexities to an already complex market. It was noted that the Clinton Administration

actively tried to speed up the process towards a more integrated transatlantic defense market, whereas the Bush Administration has been agnostic on the issue, to say the least. Everybody recognized that progress has been made, but nobody dared to draw any final conclusion: it is too early, and at the moment uncertain, whether the transatlantic market will head towards greater integration, especially if political action is absent.

**Consolidation of the US defense market as a potential drive for greater openness.** Participants commented on the Airbus-Northrop Grumman consortium deal and most read it as a positive sign. Some interpreted it as an attempt to reach out to foreign firms in consideration of declining domestic competitiveness in the US. A participant noted that the US market is perhaps the most consolidated, but also the larger and more transparent, while the European one is not consolidated yet, mainly because it is currently more fragmented. Others noted that US culture of national security, which became even more pervasive after Sept 11, is an obstacle in itself to openness and integration. An American participant noted that, although the risk of protectionism in this field is very real, instruments such as ITAR often embody legitimate concerns having to do with national security: the US does not want its technology and arms to be shipped to third countries through the European market, especially if these are rivals, or outright enemies, of the US. Here, the arms embargo on China is a case in point.

**The US market is and will remain ahead. Transatlantic imbalance is not bad in itself.** Most participants then noted that the US market is not only larger but more advanced than Europe's and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future, if only because the Pentagon doctrine relies on this advantage as an instrument of national security and power. Most participants also agreed that EU countries are unlikely to increase their defense budgets and will keep importing technology from the US, while also developing their own. After considering these disparities, a participant suggested , and many agreed, that there is no reason to be obsessed with the current transatlantic imbalance because: 1. even if it remains the same, there will be room for important improvements in the direction of greater integration 2. the imbalance may just reflect a comparative advantage which it would be uneconomical to erase by political decision. What many participants, be they American or European, deemed as more important, is greater access rather than balance. Integration would flow from greater access, largely

regardless of balance, and could be further favored by joint training and greater interoperability between European and American forces. This may give a boost to the creation of a market for transatlantic defense products. In this connection, a participant stressed the difference between the arms and defense markets: although obviously linked, the two cannot follow the same dynamic, arms being among the most sensitive defense products over which states often want direct control.

**The European market is still fragmented. Integration will not become synonymous with protection.** Participants recognized that efforts have been made to integrate the European defense market but also acknowledged that fragmentation still prevails over integration. Many pointed at the several duplications that still exist among EU members. It was pointed out that the time for “going national” at the European level seems to be over but that talking of a unified market is premature. It was suggested that greater powers be given to EU institutions, such as the European Defense Agency, but some replied that there currently are 27 different interpretations of the exact prerogatives that this institution should have. Other argued that it is precisely the existence of such institutions that can assure greater openness, because the alternative is defense markets being dependent on the interest of national defense firms and governments which would likely oppose integration on the grounds of the loss of national jobs. It was also argued that higher investments in research and technology in Europe may lead to greater integration in Europe and greater transatlantic integration through products that would be highly competitive with their American counterparts. This could happen defense through a more efficient redistribution of resources even if European defense budgets do not increase.

While some participants suggested that the top priority for Europe is to set its own house in order, others worried that such a process might ultimately lead to a protectionist Europe, or “fortress Europe”. Nobody welcomed the latter outcome but many participants, especially Americans, considered this risk as very real. In this connection, a participant argued that the best guarantee against such an outcome, would be to give more prerogatives to EU institutions and agencies, since national capitals are often more prone to protection. Encouraging signs are not only the growing number of US products containing European components, but also products such as the JSF fighter (a technologically advanced aircraft) which are the result of transatlantic technological and industrial cooperation.





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# TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2008

## CONFERENCE PROGRAM

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Rome, May 12-13 2008

In cooperation with Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC; European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Paris

with the support of German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF-US); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Rome Office; Compagnia di San Paolo, Turin; Italian Ministry of Defense

hosted by Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD), Palazzo Salviati, Piazza della Rovere, 83, Rome

Working Language: English

### MONDAY, May 12

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14:00 – 14:30

**Welcome address and introductory remarks**

**General Vincenzo Camporini**, Italian Chief of Joint Staff

**Stefano Silvestri**, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

*Introduced by CASD President*

**Presentation of the Symposium**

**Ettore Greco**, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

14:30 – 16:15

FIRST SESSION

*The future of the Euro-Atlantic security relationship*

Chair

**Marcin Zaborowski**, Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Paris

Paper-givers	<b>Leon Fuerth</b> , George Washington University, Washington, DC <b>Bruno Tertrais</b> , Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Paris
Discussants	<b>Danielle Pletka</b> , American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Washington, DC <b>Sven Biscop</b> , Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels <b>Ulrike Guérot</b> , European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
<b>16:30 – 18:15</b>	<u>SECOND SESSION</u> <i>The evolution of crisis management operations</i>
Chair	<b>Luciano Callini</b> , Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Paper givers	<b>James Dobbins</b> , RAND Corporation, Arlington <b>Tomas Valasek</b> , Centre for European Reform (CER), London
Discussants	<b>Julianne Smith</b> , Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC <b>Daniel Keohane</b> , European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Paris
<b>20:00</b>	Dinner <i>Keynote speech on Italy's European and transatlantic policy after the 13-14 April general election.</i> <b>Stefano Silvestri</b> , President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

**TUESDAY, May 13**

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**9:15 – 11:00**

**THIRD SESSION**

*Counter-terrorism strategies*

Chair

**Tom Sanderson**, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC

Paper givers

**Ian Shapiro**, Yale University, New Haven  
**Paul Wilkinson**, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews

Discussants

**Reuel Marc Gerecht**, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Washington, DC  
**Fernando Reinares**, Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid  
**Natalino Ronzitti**, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

**11:15 – 13:15**

**FOURTH SESSION**

*Defense industry and transatlantic relations*

Chair

**Giovanni Gasparini**, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Paper givers

**Christine Fisher**, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC  
**Andrew James**, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester

Discussants

**Jeffrey Bialos**, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC  
**Thomas Bauer**, Research Fellow, Center for Applied Policy Research (C.A.P.), Munich

**13:15 – 13:30**

**Concluding remarks**

**Ettore Greco**, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

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