


NATO 3.0

Fresh Proposals by the World Security Network



With Contributions from

Berlin, London, Rome, Warsaw, Tallinn,
Budapest, Ankara, Washington DC, and Paris

By

Dr Hubertus Hoffmann, LtGen ret Edward L. Rowley, LtGen ret Dr Klaus Olshausen, MajGen ret Sir Sebastian Roberts, LtGen ret Dr Ulf von Krause, Vice Admiral ret Charles Style, Rear Admiral ret Dr David K. Shimp, Tunne Kelam MEP, Prof. Hüseyin Bağcı, Géza Jászszky, Prof. Umberto Gori, LtGen ret Götz Gliemerth, BrigGen ret Dieter Farwick, Henning-Hubertus Baron von Steuben, Przemyslaw Aleksander Schmid, Richard Nunneley, Fabrizio Bozzato and Leonard Wessendorff.*

Including French Statements by

Admiral ret. Pierre Lacoste (former Director DGSE) and
Rear Admiral ret Jean Dufourcq (Chief Editor Revue Défense Nationale)

September 6th, 2013

Demands

Once again, NATO' s members are called upon to decide if, how and when the Alliance - its leading nation, the United States of America, and willing partners – will engage effectively to contain, if not resolve another brutal conflict in the Islamic world. This time it is Syria, the fifth prospective intervention, following Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Mali, in only a dozen years. The task has become even more urgent since the recent use of chemical weapons: to prevent their further use; to stop the killing of civilians especially by the Assad regime's Air Force and artillery (although it is already too late for the 100,000 slaughtered); to end the brutal dictatorship in Damascus by all legal means, if necessary military as well as non-military; and to help to build in its place a fair government representing and uniting all of the people of Syria; to stand up for and maintain the human values of the United Nations Charter, not least the rights of minorities; while ensuring the position of Turkey as a member of NATO; all against the background of the tremendous challenge of achieving stability in the whole Middle East region.

The debate over the military and non-military options and associated dilemmas in Washington, London, Paris and other NATO capitals shows once again the need for a better NATO strategy that integrates hard and soft power in peacemaking through a far earlier, more credible and effective crisis response. The tragedies in Syria demonstrate the necessity of a strong defense capability in NATO to complement and underpin diplomacy and other non-military activity, and deter the use of weapons. We need capabilities across the full spectrum of crisis response, from the soft to the hard, integrated into a new dual strategy. We call for innovative tools in the Alliance's military and political approach: *a new NATO 3.0*.

In his speech at the National Defense University on May 23rd 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that “We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas.” We agree

and have to learn from the wisdom of exceptional thinkers like Albert Einstein, who told us that “imagination is more important than knowledge” and that “we cannot solve the problems on the same level of thinking where we have created them.” We need to use our Western democratic strengths: creativity and reform capabilities like we do in business. But still, we hesitate to do so in defense and foreign affairs—why?

NATO must become more political, reconsidering the wisdom of Carl von Clausewitz that “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means”. *Defense, including crisis response and foreign policy must be much better interlinked and lead to one action on two pillars of a fresh NATO double strategy.*

In Lisbon in 2010, and again in Chicago in 2012, NATO pushed a so-called ‘New Strategic Concept,’ with the goal of being “more effective, more engaged, more efficient, and better able to address the 21st century security challenges.” The Heads of State and Government asked the Secretary General and the Council “to take forward the reform process in all necessary areas without delay.”

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 stated that “strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.”

Ivo Daalder, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, complained on June 17th, 2013: “Recent trends in defense spending threaten NATO’s ability to confidently face a dangerous and unpredictable future. Most European Allies are hollowing out their militaries, jettisoning capabilities, and failing to spend their existing budgets wisely. As a result, the gap between American and European contributions to the Alliance is

widening to an unsustainable level. Something must be done. The trends need to be reversed.”

NATO Headquarters wants to go ahead with these necessary reforms, but most of the 28 member states have not implemented the proposed steps. Only the eastern and Central European countries have pushed the reforms forward, which have become lost in national bureaucracies with differing national agendas. In reality, the reforms and cost-efficient co-operation have been hampered, sometimes even blocked as a result of narrow-minded national egoisms.

In a rapidly-changing and demanding world, with global threats, new players and economic crises, after the longest and largest engagement the Alliance so far, in Afghanistan, all NATO countries, including the U.S., need to decisively implement the lessons learned, combined with an evaluation process concerning NATO engagements and revised institutional setup, an overall strategic debate and – as has been demanded for decades – much closer cooperation and less short-sighted, selfish behavior between partner states and economies.

If NATO does not, it will fall into the trap of always refighting the last battle and not considering how to deal with fresh asymmetric challenges.

In December 2007, five former Chiefs of Defense Staff from Europe and the U.S. made profound and forward-looking concrete proposals in their study, “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership,” which have still not been implemented.¹ Its political structure, still embodying elements of the Cold War, does not reflect how much the world has changed. The outdated, stove-pipe systems of specified committees and bottom-up reporting structures need to be seriously re-considered.²

Any action plan based on knowledge development, drawing on sober evaluations, needs to filter out and make use of best practices, incorporating the immense knowledge derived from different missions

and varying national defense plans and diverse experiences in order to promote flexible, smart and cost-efficient defense efforts in the next phase of the most successful defense cooperation on Earth.

NATO and its member states now need:

- Not more nice demands on paper in communiqués but real action and implementation by all member states. No more blocking of the necessary reforms in the Alliance at the national level, but co-ownership of the NATO Headquarters in an urgent reform process with the 28 Heads of Member States.
- A list of short- and long-term reform steps, including timetables, price tags and a control mechanism to check up on progress.
- A totally new set-up, fresh dynamic and ongoing reform process in all member states initiated by a well-coordinated, top-down approach from both the NATO Headquarters and Heads of States and Governments. Otherwise, any reform process will fail.
- A modern, flexible security and defense structure, including maximum cost-efficiency.
- Sufficient national funding of two percent of GDP as a NATO benchmark to avoid further erosion of credible defense and to avoid “provocative weakness” (Fritz Kraemer). Most European allies must invest more in modern defense capabilities, which are their insurance against crisis and war and for liberty and stability. Thus, a comprehensive Smart Defense approach by those member states that are willing to proceed in their mutual cooperation should be made mandatory.
- A much better link between foreign and defense policies to build up an effective early forward defense against new threats using best practices from all over the world and much more creativity.

- Embedded, tailored double strategies of power and diplomacy – as was so successfully done with NATO’s Harmel Report in 1967 or in NATO’s Two Track Decision in 1979, using multiple soft tools of peace-making at an earlier stage to contain threats – while being prepared to fight if needed.
- To analyze and agree on the new threats and how to contain and deter those unknown risks using the hard and soft elements of peacemaking with detailed but flexible action plans rather than only short-term crisis-management when it is very late. The establishment of a NATO Early Warning System in order to identify possible risks, dangers and threats at an early stage and an effective NATO Cyber Defense is clearly justified. This would create new opportunities to put the comprehensive approach into practice, so it would not only always be reacting to live crises with military intervention – rarely at the right time.
- To focus on the build-up of responsible elites in our partner countries and partners for peace who promote know-how and shared democratic values based on the UN Charter and the Washington Treaty.
- Both the U.S. and Europe need a solid national economic base in order to afford sufficient armed forces, extend economic support to underdeveloped countries and ensure internal stability and credibility as democracies. For a decade, the XXL-greedies and XXL-public debt have been sawing away at the branch on which we are sitting at NATO. Public debt must be reduced to a stable 60 percent of GDP level in all NATO countries as a basis of transatlantic stability. Without sufficient economic power, the sword of NATO remains dull and the West a lame duck. We only won the Cold War because of the enormous economic superiority of the West, which is now threatened.

Any future North Atlantic Alliance should not be judged in the first place by its organization and command structure but by its political commitment to engage in the new world order for the betterment of the people of its member states.

A realistic assessment of the present situation of NATO is needed. It is already a coalition of the capable and the willing – as in Libya, Mali or Syria. The U.S. shoulders most of NATO's budgets and is not willing to sustain that burden. Most European governments have until now not shown the political resolve to invest more resources. The Alliance has no authority to dictate anything and is only as strong as the nations want or allow it to be. The UN is not capable of taking the lead in UN politico-military operations. There is no efficient UN structure in the field to parallel the military command structure. The U.S. can use NATO as a tool box, as well as for building greater legitimacy, but NATO has lost some of its significance in the United States.

In times when economics have a major effect on security issues, the Alliance should finally start to widen its focus to those areas of concern much more intensively.

Another source of future risks is all of the elements of the digital age. The Alliance will have to face the challenges of the cyber domain far beyond the protection of its own C4I structure.

A vibrant, strong, globally-influential and smart NATO 3.0 needs a solid economic base, much more creativity and fresh thinking, the integration of smart ideas and best practices of peace-making at an early stage in clever double-strategies, sufficient funding, a global outlook and risk-assessment and an open debate about options and concrete actions instead of endless talk.

The independent and global World Security Network Foundation – which is promoting a fresh and active foreign and defense policy we call World 3.0 – has asked its mainly young and as well senior

members of the International Advisory Board, including several former generals and admirals, politicians and experts from Europe and the U.S., to add their fresh proposals to a short action paper entitled NATO 3.0. The main contributors from different countries are named above. It is a first living draft of an innovative picture with several new puzzle-pieces and more to be added, and is intended to initiate a vital debate.

Below, you will find some ideas to stimulate the transatlantic and European discussions. Become part of this process and mail your proposals to us at: hubertus@worldsecuritynetwork.com. You can find out more about us at www.worldsecuritynetwork.com and www.codesoftolerance.com and on Facebook, YouTube und Twitter.

An Overall Strategic Debate is Needed

The Alliance is in urgent need of an overall strategic debate to broaden the basis of common interests between the societies of its member and partner nations and to foster the understanding of different views. This strategic debate should encompass the current engagements of the Alliance, contrasting them against the originally-defined aims and goals and thus contribute to a lessons-learnt process.

National Interest in a Globalized World

We are organized as a collection of nations; governments are responsible for the advancement and protection of their own people, and thus national interest is a legitimate driving concept. But how do we think about and define this in the 21st century? Nations and blocs are tied together technologically and through trade and commerce. They are also increasingly economically interdependent. For example, US debt stands at \$17 trillion, and

continues to rise. China ‘owns’ much of this debt, boasts a massive surplus and is increasing its international influence by the day.

And yet, policy-makers in the NATO states still talk and sometimes act as if nations are free agents. They are not: we are all bound together now, in the Alliance and the world.

This is as true in stark financial terms as it is for the sake of the planet and its population. Thus, the term ‘national interest’ is a double-edged sword if simplistically conceived. International cooperation must be the way forward, notwithstanding the limitations of the UN. In this context, an organization such as NATO, which has the standing to draw people together at the highest levels, must continue to play a central role, with a greater focus on the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the Washington Treaty of 1949.

Good-Bye Doomsday, Welcome Optimism

NATO policies ought to be conducted with crisp and self-confident optimism. We are the most successful peace-keeping organization on the globe and can continue to be.

Pessimism and doomsday scenarios merely have a paralyzing effect. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the USSR, the integration of all Eastern European countries in the EU and NATO, the dismantling of the SS-20 ICBMs, or the youth rebellion in North Africa, deliver examples of positive surprises in world politics. The glass is half-full and a better world is possible. NATO must become an active shaper of comprehensive security and stability instead of merely administering some crises – optimism via a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This optimistic attitude is needed in the difficult long-term relationships with a more assertive Russia and the rising Asian

superpower, the People's Republic of China. We cannot expect friendship over night. Building trust will take several more decades and plenty of patience, while taking a step-by-step approach on the many critical issues. *We should always follow an open-door approach over the decades to come.*

A Value Partnership is our Holy Flame

NATO and its members must put its core values at the center of its policy and avoid a focus on technology and organizational issues. Our Alliance needs a soul and this must be integrated like a holy flame into all strategic approaches and actions for peace and stability.

Our values are based on the UN Charter, which is shared by all 198 members of the United Nations.

The solidarity of free people in our political transatlantic insurance organization includes a fair and just sharing of burdens and the fruits of protection.

The people within the Alliance – soldiers and civilians – and their needs for protection and support are our top priority, including the tasks in Articles 1 and 2 of the Washington treaty.

NATO also has a responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights in a globalized world outside our core areas. The NATO intervention in The Balkans was motivated by the need to protect human rights and contain inhumanity. Our engagement in Afghanistan was the response to attacks on one of our founding partners, the United States of America.

Where human rights are suppressed in a brutal way, the swamp of injustice and instability begins. Terrorist threats are bred in failed states. Dictators stimulate hate and still threaten others. *Support for the institutions which fight for our common values – as summarized in*

the UN-Charter – must be better structured to prevent or contain instability early enough.

Our NATO security and defense policy therefore has to start as soon as possible, as smart forward defense with the use of soft factors of crisis prevention, crisis response and peace-making, as well as reconciliation and credible deterrence, with intervention tools as a back-up to avoid the need for the use of military power. There must be a fresh, rock-solid one-peace-policy of power and diplomacy to successfully contain those global risks at an early stage.

Any containment partner and nation seeking NATO's help must commit itself to the UN Charter before NATO countries can support it. We cannot strengthen those which do not stand for freedom as defined by the UN but for dictatorship by another name. We must isolate and contain the radicals as well. Going forward, this must be the condition for any political support or NATO intervention in all crises and violent conflicts.

Cultural Awareness is Essential – Expanding our U.S. or European-Centric World View

It is well-known that no strategy can be effective without awareness between different cultures. This – amongst other things – is to ensure that decisions on the handling of a complex international tapestry are made on the basis of the best possible understanding of the aims and aspirations of its various entities. But this can be difficult, not least because speech and the written word are imperfect ways to transmit and receive meaning, especially when translation is required.

Meaning depends on history, philosophy, experience and education, to name but a few of its aspects. What is 'good' in one place might be 'bad' in another. The requirement is to understand why, so that decisions are based on sound judgment. Nowhere is this more

important and challenging than between ‘west’ and ‘east.’ For each side to avoid misjudgment and misinterpretation, up to and including the conducting of unnecessary wars: *No investment in mutual understanding will ever be a waste. If we get this wrong, the consequences for world peace and security could be extreme.* Usually, however, the pressures of real life and responsibility allow too little time.

NATO states need to focus on cultural awareness and widen their U.S. or European-centric worldview in their defense cooperation, planning and interventions.

We Are Our Main Enemy – Shape Reality – Smart Double-Strategies Needed

We should never merely blame the bad guys, jihadists, or dictators for what they do. NATO members must instead be self-critical, examining what needs to be improved to make us smarter as well as stronger than our enemies. We need a continually adapting and robust policy to avoid any ignorance or arrogance.

Our own 28 national governments and bureaucracies constitute our main adversarial challenge-we are our own main enemy. Experience shows that at the end of a frustrating, grinding decision-making process, we usually burn too much money for little output and are too slow, uncoordinated, and inefficient. This dreadful ‘red tape monster’ is harder to fight than any enemy. It is the Alliance’s main Achilles Heel, causing us to win on the battlefield but lose in the long-term and to produce one ‘lost victory’ after another. Our enemies often do not constitute the main and only threat, which is, rather, our system’s inability to enable our nations to deal effectively and creatively with them. This must be radically changed now as part of a fresh NATO 3.0 approach.

On the whole, we are still unable to keep up with such rapid developments, barely gaining a common understanding of the complex new world, and hardly exerting any influence on the course of events. Oftentimes, we become passive onlookers rather than movers and shakers for a better world. We attempt to shape the world with pep talks, international conferences and state visits – but is this enough?

Political rhetoric carries the day, while actual plans and deeds are rare. Today, a nearly endless diagnosis replaces therapy. The usual discussions and international meetings dealing with foreign policy mostly end without considering the consequences, plans and precise implementation. Hardly anyone in charge asks the hard questions about where, when and how. This attitude reflects the Health and Safety: Risk free society which has all but subsumed commonsense. However this is where effective work starts. Success or failure will be determined in this realm of plans and options.

Proactive policy is missing in standing up for our values- the ‘Holy Flame’ of the UN Charter- and a better future for our children.

The subjunctive has taken over. A growing number of problems are merely being described, but few are being processed and none mastered.

We are leaving the initiative to a few radical activists – who represent a tiny minority of around one percent of the global population – and through our passivity we are creating an action vacuum full of provocative weaknesses.

We are not acting, but instead becoming the object of action.

We are not shaping, but instead reacting to new developments.

Thus, we are losing influence and reputation.

In view of today's paradigmatic shift in foreign policy, what is needed is a new neutralizing of the numerous time bombs, large and small, that endanger our security, alongside a policy of preventive stabilization within NATO, transcending traditional deterrence.

Proactive rather than reactive actions are essential.

We must concentrate on interests, before it is too late and they get out of control. Our current pure crisis management – which we call NATO 2.0 – is no longer sufficient, as we can see now in Syria.

We must address the roots of tensions, such as ethnic conflicts, hunger, poverty, health, population growth, water shortages and underdeveloped agriculture. These issues will lead to the destabilization of Africa and – most importantly – the southern coast of the Mediterranean; our southern NATO waters.

We must collect, evaluate, strengthen, and implement best practices on a global scale, using all assets including intelligence. Until now, this learning process appears to have been overly bureaucratic, slow and lacking in dynamism.

We must analyze and assess well beyond the existing limitations towards political- and military thought, and begin to deliberate in new and broader international networks and coalitions.

In an age of towering debts and limited budgets, we are obliged to calculate precisely what we can afford and which funding mix will enable maximum output with fairly limited input.

What Can We Do?

What is needed is a proactive security policy that identifies and addresses several areas of crisis and conflict before they become a military threat and a new kind of preventive and forward-looking defense and stabilization plans with a focus on the containment of

radicals, good government, development programs and partnership initiatives with the EU and UN.

This comprehensive approach is the key point of any NATO reform and to successful missions. Foresighted strategies need the involvement of all actors in the planning process. Modern conflicts require complex solutions and the success of a mission cannot be achieved by military force alone. Furthermore, there cannot a trouble-spot cannot be entered into without an exit strategy built on realistic objectives, allowing redeployment when accomplished.

The Maghreb/MENA must be the top priority of the European NATO partners and the EU. Up till now, there has been too much talk, too little action and no comprehensive planning.

NATO has to deter, contain and answer new threats to its member states globally. Terrorism, cyber attacks and the threats of chemical or nuclear weapons have no local mailbox and can no longer be located easily. There are threats coming from out of the dark with immense effects, as we saw on 9/11 and later. The Alliance must be prepared to tackle surprises – yet there is no fresh or convincing mindset to be seen for a strategy with highly adaptable options.

NATO and its member states should *act at the right/appropriate time – before violent conflicts break out – i.e. with a preventive containment policy, and not when the costs of intervention appear to be too high.*

NATO must act early, with both non-military/civil and military means, before it is too late to avoid the actual use of arms, to prevent many soldiers and thousands of civilians from being killed and hundreds of billions being spent. Thus, non-military/civil instruments of preventive peace-making and crisis prevention become essential for the success of NATO in out-of-area crisis prevention and response, including peace-making. They must be an integrated part of our wider

defense planning, in closer cooperation with other ministries, in particular foreign and development affairs.

A NATO Early Warning System for identifying potential crises or conflict areas or issues needs to be established. Once a year, NATO should publish an annual *NATO Global Risk Report*, which should include proposals for actions to safeguard the Alliance and support the stabilization of the world, with a focus on MENA and failed states. It should address special current areas of interest like Afghanistan, Iran, Syria or Mali. As an annual report, each risk report should be comprehensive with sections covering each region of the globe. It should include a ranking scale (numeric, color-coded, or some other indicator) that identifies the nature and scale of each risk. Where it identifies risks of a certain magnitude, the report should also suggest possible policy solutions. The report must be public in order to put pressure on Heads of State to act before it is too late and to inform the nations.

The non-military elements and instruments of peace-making must be better integrated as soft factors into a united foreign, security and defense policy approach. We need a double track of strength/power and diplomacy – as was demonstrated so successfully over decades with the Harmel Report from 1967 and NATO's Two Track Decisions from 1979.

We do not need more communiqués, but sufficient funding and action to implement a step-by-step creative defense policy for the 21st century. A review of NATO's progress should include fresh challenges and new creative options and proposals, ready to be implemented through an action plan in NATO and the EU.

We have to adapt to the present and future dynamics and developments with hard and soft power, military might and all civil means to mitigate tensions, dangers and threats.

For all areas of global conflict, we need new and preventive NATO double strategies tailored to the special conditions, plus special adapted forces. As well we need the clear will to deter and defend with all instruments of politics.

Military responses and invasions are not enough, and can even become a cause of future political failures.

Those long-term double strategies in the changed environment are still missing and thus, a pragmatic, ad-hoc and often short-sighted step-by-step approach prevails.

NATO must – as a condition sine qua non – always establish a detailed and comprehensive strategy and an action plan before it activates its forces. These detailed and plausible plans must include a timeframe with possible exit scenarios, cost-calculations and sufficient funding, best practices from past conflicts, consider the local will of the people involved and negotiations with the adversary from the beginning or reconciliation options- following the advice of Carl von Clausewitz.³

In 2008, the Bucharest NATO summit clearly stated the necessity of “bringing together civilian and military efforts.” NATO, however, does not have the necessary resources to bring non-military measures to bear. Therefore, decisions in many cases are taken with a primarily military focus; in the allocation of resources, the military share is dominant and, as a consequence, the core objectives aimed at state or nation-building are falling behind, because the 28 nations do not want major non-military efforts via NATO.

A modern mission scenario calls for the cooperation of all governmental actors in conflict. Governance, economics, security and stability, health and education are key factors in this comprehensive approach. Therefore, any strategy has to look beyond military measures and take all other aspects into consideration. A close

cooperation between all ministries and agencies in the NATO Member states must also be pushed forward.

Thus, the Alliance should build up its own capacities as well as procedures of cooperation to use the capabilities of member nations and the EU more effectively and concertedly, in partnership with military measures. The strategy paper, “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,” demands that non-military means must become part of an integrated NATO strategy, arguing that the use of force is by no means the only means by which to tackle crises. In many cases, the use of force is counter-productive to strategic objectives. Success in today’s armed conflicts, especially non-international ones, cannot be granted by just killing or capturing as many enemies as possible.⁴

To achieve this better cooperation between NATO and the EU in those areas, however, we have to identify the prize tags of Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and N-Cyprus to overcome the strategic deadlock amongst both organizations.⁵

We need to develop procedures for the assessment of the rewards and risks of an intervention with military and non-military instruments in advance. The interventions of the past show in most crises a tendency of calling for military action, often without thorough analysis of the given situation, the preconditions for enduring success and without defining the purpose and objectives and an end point which could serve as a criterion for the success or failure of a mission.

There must be a build-up of capabilities and a check-list for non-military measures in order to implement the comprehensive approach before any military intervention. This requires interlinking defense and foreign affairs and developing approaches in all NATO countries. This has not yet been done or at least sufficiently achieved early on before conflicts get out of control. For each possible area of conflict, we need comprehensive action plans at the earliest stage. Now, we almost always come too late.

Any intervention must have a conceptual framework for action in advance. Intervention should be understood in a comprehensive sense, politically combining all requirements for non-military and military assets.

This framework should provide answers to the following questions: What is the respective country's importance (short- and long-term assessment) for the Alliance or for individual members? If it is not in the interest of all members: is the importance for the Alliance paramount to national interests in order to motivate those members to participate? Are the nations which may participate willing to contribute the necessary resources – non-militarily and militarily – to carry the burdens, including casualties, and to remain committed to the project, if necessary, over a long period? What are the chances of achieving the defined objectives? If these objectives include state- or nation-building: is there a social basis in the respective country on which to build up democracy? Only if these questions are answered positively should an intervention be considered.

Before deciding on military actions within such an intervention, one has to reflect and understand to what extent the use of force can contribute to overcome the problems. Problem-solving relates first and foremost to the problems of the respective country or region and not the problems of politics within NATO or its member states. In other words, military intervention should be understood as a means of politics, not a substitute for it.

Every war also brings the need for reconstruction and reconciliation, often on a massive and intensive scale. NATO campaigns in The Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are the Alliance's most recent reminders of this. NATO's original members, led by the USA, set an as yet unmatched example of doing this well in post-WWII reconstruction throughout the world. An adapted kind of new 'Marshall Plan' should be the benchmark for planning and execution,

with reconstruction and reconciliation planning starting as soon as campaign planning. This includes identifying, networking, educating, and training the relevant expert organizations and individuals.

NATO should set up a *NATO Reconstruction Planning Organization*, most probably based on a network of existing institutions, like the RCDS or NATO Defense College. This organization could be virtual, helping to deliver modules in existing institutions and courses. Aspects of this new organization could include networking with the right experts; focusing on ‘Golden Bridges’ for all: reconstruction emphasizing hope, self-respect and self-determination; truth and reconciliation; peace-talks with enemies from the beginning, looking for a long-term political solution; military and civilian planning; reeducation and the use of diasporas and massive support for the local and younger “responsibility-elites”.

The Heads of States have to clearly deliver the complex prospects of missions to create awareness in the respective publics and parliaments that modern crisis response missions can mean an ongoing and long-term engagement in a region or country.

NATO should also establish a *NATO Soft Peacemaking Center* for non-military emergencies and crisis response. It can be built around elements of the International Staff of the NATO Headquarters like ‘Science for Peace and Security’ and ‘Civil Emergency Planning’. This new task force should collect best practices on how best to support the containment of instabilities (as we see now in Syria). It must assemble and organize the national and international know-how of all non-military, civil factors in crisis response and peace-making from the NATO missions in Afghanistan and other out-of-area conflicts, like those in Libya and Iraq, so it is reasonably accessible for future missions.

The Alliance must analyze what went right and what went wrong in major military confrontations and filter out best practices and

solutions for future conflicts. This center should also be understood as a supplement or even complement of UN DPKO toolboxes. In the U.S., the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment reviews past military engagements to determine what worked and what didn't and to formulate lessons learned. The NATO Soft Peacemaking Center could produce reviews modeled on net assessment reports that weigh lessons learned from attempts at "soft" non-military peacemaking efforts, as listed above. They would be a reference to inform the work on future peacemaking programs.

To make best use of the know-how of our soldiers, NATO should establish two large *NATO Mentoring and People-to-People Programs* with 100,000 mentees per year. Experienced former officers recruited as mentors can thus transfer their know-how and moral values to the next generation within NATO and to other forces in countries of special interest (like Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, or Syria). For this task, we require thousands of experienced personalities capable of conveying guidelines for life to the most talented young individuals and devoting much time to them. The reserve associations of the NATO countries could greatly support the implementation of this new mentoring program for mentees from NATO states and partner and other countries. This would revitalize the reserve associations inside NATO members which suffer from a lack of purpose and strengthen the effort for a more comprehensive defense. Thus, we partner with the people and bring our values to other cultures. At the same time, we learn to understand them better. We strengthen the Alliance with the smart use of know-how and help others to find their way to a better future.

One new focus for the toolbox of non-military, civil factors of crisis response and peace-making should be on recruiting a fresh and responsible generation in areas of special interest. We must identify many more new talents, support them on-site and invite them to join

us, providing necessary know-how and life-long contacts, as well as nurturing mutual trust.

Once a year, NATO could host a *Global NATO Town Hall Meeting* in different capitals and invite one thousand representatives of non-governmental organizations to discuss issues of peace and stability with NATO officials and make proposals for the future. Town Hall meetings would have a specific regional focus. An initial topic for a Town Hall could be Afghanistan. Discussion could focus on military and non-military roles for NATO in helping to strengthen the country's governance. To ensure that they are focused events with defined goals, an Afghanistan meeting could begin with a keynote from a high-ranking official who could speak of the country's long-term security needs from prior experience. A keynote would be followed by panels of NGO representatives to discuss issues raised in the speech.

In a globalized world, different people's networks and NGOs play an important role. They add unique wisdom, engagement and millions of young activists and concerned global citizens. *NATO must better use and integrate these NGOs and social networks into its discussion process and thus add creativity and mutual understanding.*

NATO should establish formal diplomatic special relationships and liaison offices with new players like the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council and even the People's Republic of China and our Pacific value partners in Japan and Australia beyond the global partnership approach for three reasons: To better understand their defense thinking; to build up personal relationships and first cooperations like the anti-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean or Afghanistan; and to reduce the mistrust of those far-away states which themselves have to learn about us and our values.

Harmonizing Decision-Making

We need to harmonize procedures of decision-making by considering different national interests and specific legislation. The current NATO procedures govern the decision-making process in the Alliance. The national interests and formalities in the Alliance member states, however, differ in a substantial manner and block reforms.

For example, France has specific interests in its former colonial regions, the French government has the authority to engage the armed forces in an assignment abroad, and in urgent cases the President can decide on this. On the other hand, we find in German society a deep-rooted reservation with regard to the use of military force as a means of foreign policy. Any military assignment of the Bundeswehr, especially for combat purposes, needs constitutional approval from the German Parliament. As the Mali case shows, the French government and President do not hesitate to use their forces if need without complicated consultations in the Alliance. These substantial differences need to be harmonized in the decision-making process of NATO.

This should also reduce the “Washington-centric approach” of Western and NATO politics. Otherwise, the urgently needed “division of labor” between the partners (“Smart Defense”, “Pooling” and “Sharing”) – the first pillar of cooperation – will fail, simply because relevant integrated structures within NATO or the EU will not come into being unless all partners are confident that capabilities which they no longer have at their disposal will be reliably provided by others when they need them.

For the above example, this could mean: France has to make sure to go into military engagements after consulting its partners whenever time allows, while the German Bundestag has to create political mechanisms to approve in advance certain military commitments of

integrated structures (like the NATO Reaction Forces or EU Battle Groups) within defined and agreed contingencies.

We support the proposal by the five former Chiefs of Defense Staff in their study, “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,” to abandon the consensus principle at all levels below the NATO Council, and to introduce at the committee and working-group levels a majority voting rule. This would enable NATO to take quick decisions in crises. Those nations that contribute to a mission should have the right to determine the process of the operation. Those which do not commit forces must be kept out, but kept informed. NATO needs more operational command with fewer national caveats. The infrastructure budget might be replaced by a common procurement budget for assets and capacities that NATO may wish to fund. The Alliance must develop an information strategy that can influence the world’s perception that NATO is a force for good and wins hearts and minds at home and abroad, if and when engaged in crisis prevention, crisis response and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

In its current form as an Alliance of 28 members, each with different rules of engagement, political systems and historical burdens and cultural peculiarities, NATO in an ever more complex world should newly define the demand that solidarity within the Alliance requires all countries to join all crisis response operations. But all member nations will have to sign up politically for the operation to give it legitimacy beyond a coalition of the willing. With this predicament a flexible response from new inner-NATO groupings serves the purpose well, as was the case in Iraq, Libya or Mali. Where an Alliance member does not participate, it should make a solidarity payment to NATO as part of the policy of fair burden-sharing. It could be calculated on the basis of the GNP share of the nation. Every five years, the Secretary General will report about the status of fair burden-sharing and solidarity in the Alliance.

Defense Budgets Must Stick to Two Percent of GDP

The increased international responsibilities of NATO and its member states require sufficient budgeting. There can be no diplomacy without assets of power and the political will to use if needed behind it. A double strategy of power and diplomacy needs a credible and usable base in terms of defense capabilities.

NATO is a transatlantic cooperation, and Europe must bear its share of the burden. After three decades of discussions to emancipate itself, *Europe must build up sufficient defense means and pool its defense capacities to secure its interests and back diplomatic actions in a globalized World 3.0 to avoid “Provocative Weakness”* (Fritz Kraemer). Europeans must recognize the many areas of instability and change on Europe’s southern shores in the Maghreb/ MENA region, while the lead-partner – the USA – gives more attention to the Pacific and China. But that does not mean giving up a common responsibility as an Alliance for coherent global activities as required.

Security for the Europeans has still an agreed price tag of two percent of the GDP and is not a gift granted by the Americans. New, fair burden-sharing is a must in a globalized world with greater orientation of the U.S. towards Asia.

Especially in Europe, defense budgets have declined. According to the World Bank, NATO defense spending varies between 1 and 4.7 percent of GDP.⁶ Hungary and Latvia spent only 1 percent in 2011; Belgium, Spain and the Czech Republic, 1.1 percent; next, Germany spent only 1.3 percent; The Netherlands, 1.4; Denmark, 1.5; Italy, 1.6 and thus all are below the 2 percent needed. Poland came close, with 1.9; France was 2.2; Turkey, 2.3; the United Kingdom, 2.6; and the United States, 4.7 percent.

The CSIS paper states that “in 2011 European NATO members fell \$80 billion short of that commitment. On average, defense spending of

European Allies was 1.62 percent of the GDP, with 20 out of 28 NATO members spending less than this average and only 6 European countries (Estonia, France, Greece, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) spending more.”⁷

Is this fair and a mark of solidarity within Europe and the transatlantic region? Even considering the expensive nuclear arsenals of the U.S., UK and France, the other nations, especially Germany, with below 1.5 percent, must invest more in the hard factors of crisis-response and peace-making in NATO.

“According to NATO,” the CSIS writes, “the 26 European allies (minus Canada and the United States) combined spent \$282 billion on defense budgets in 2011 (or about 27.2 percent of the NATO total). While that isn’t an insignificant sum, in comparison, the United States spent \$731 billion (70.5 percent). Washington policymakers are now arguing that NATO must quickly move toward a 50/50 rather than a 75/25 alliance.”⁷

All member states must commit themselves to spending enough for a modern defense capability within the Alliance of a minimum of 2 percent of gross national product. There can be no free-riders forcing unfair burdens on others. NATO needs fair load-sharing, a necessary foundation of solidarity. If any states spend less and therefore harm solidarity within the common defense system, they will have to pay a solidarity compensation of half of the difference to NATO budgets.

On the European side, NATO lacks 15 relevant, even critical capacities, including air-refuelling, strategic airlift, smart bombs, surveillance, reconnaissance or electronic warfare capacities, or integrated chemical defense capability.

Better Harmonization in Armament

Particularly in a time of limited budgets, all NATO countries need, more than ever, much better harmonization in terms of armament. This has been the subject of many declarations of intent for decades and many papers are filled with nice looking projects, but cooperation on a larger scale has been poorly realized in reality.

As the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed in a recent study: “European NATO members are buying duplicative capabilities to support their own domestic industries which undermine proposed pooling and sharing arrangements. For example, there are no less than 23 different types of armored vehicles with varying calibers of ammunition that will be commissioned in Europe in the next 10 years for 26 European NATO members. European armed forces have seven types of combat helicopters and four types of main battle tanks. Simply put, European military capabilities are fragmented, duplicative, and more expensive than they need to be.”

Europe needs, but has denied, the effects of synergy, thus spoiling billions in national defense procurement only to keep its fragmented national defense industries in business. Besides differences in military cultures driving requirements the main obstacles to accomplish this cooperation are the supposed different national economic interests in the armaments sector. These obstacles must be removed now. Otherwise, NATO will not have a chance to assert itself within a new and dynamic World 3.0. And this, in turn, would weaken the overall economic situation of NATO nations as well.

All nations must invite tender for any armaments program from all NATO countries and reduce the range of products. NATO should become part of a new supranational decision-making process with a veto on all armaments project that do not comply with the agreed and

valid ‘Defense Package’. All tenders must be pooled by several nations. Once a year, the Secretary should report on progress in pooling, cost-efficiency and NATO-wide procurements in a detailed written report. In this area close coordination if not cooperation is required with EU CSDP efforts.

NATO has to expand its multinational force structures

NATO should proceed on its way to integrated international structures like the AWACS E 3A-component – a story of success since the early 1980s – High Readiness Headquarters, or multinational structures like the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence is one of NATO’s Centers of Excellence, located in Tallinn, Estonia. The Center attained the status of an International Military Organization in October 2008. It conducts research and training on cyber security, but no real cyber defense, which is still national. These multi-national approaches are probably the most promising way to foster “Smart Defense” and save costs.

The European Union must pool its Defense Capacities Now

For 30 years now, there have been talks, ideas and the first small steps taken towards uniting defense capacities within the European Union (EU) in a Common Security and Defense Policy. The Treaty of Lisbon called in 2007 again for a common security and defense policy and to identify the Union’s strategic interests. But too little has been achieved until now though.

Since 2003, the Berlin Plus Agreement from 1996 has regulated cooperation between NATO and the European Union in the field of crisis management. For example in Kosovo, where NATO ensured a safe and secure environment and the European Union used its

diplomatic and economic tools in order to build administration, assist in establishing a legal system and facilitate the local economy.

There are some multinational units of NATO-EU member states, like a Polish-Danish-German Multinational Corps Northeast, or a German-Netherlands Corps and the nucleus of a Eurocorps, including the German-French Brigade. NATO and the EU have closer working relations and have already shown on a small scale how they can work together effectively.

These are multinational headquarters and units of EU member states but not driven by EU CSDP policies. These are mostly NATO-Corps in Europe with multinational staff from participating states that are often EU member states as well. The only approach in Europe so far towards a multinational European unit is the German-French founded Eurocorps with six EU/NATO member states participating. This shows the challenge of increased coordination and cooperation in Europe in times of military reforms and shrinking budgets. After 30 years of talking and many ideas of a coordinated European transitional process, little has been achieved. The limited approach of establishing an EU Rapid Reaction Force with the EU Battle groups shows the missing consensus even the political unwillingness of EU member states to use those elements in crisis response operations. Those EU Battle groups formed around existing national infantry battalions with some combat support are kept at high readiness in a six months rotation. The European Air Transport Command in Eindhoven shows what else can and has to be tackled. Further important joint EU units pooling the European capacities and saving money are to be created, like a European Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (with the French, British, Spanish and Italian carriers), or an EU Submarine Command (with the British and Germans boats first) combining the units of nations with those systems.

The European nations which are members of NATO and the EU still celebrate their traditional national planning, spending no less than

\$282 billion a year on defense (2011), but not as wisely and cost-efficiently as they could be. Planning is fragmented in 28 EU states. The so called Permanent Structured Co-operation of 22 EU and NATO member states could be a valuable tool to foster the relationship and to develop modern defense assets (NATO and EU pooling and sharing). Those states being willing to improve their defense capacities will act in a spirit of mutual trust and reliability.

With many fixed costs like personnel or pensions involved, perhaps 10 percent could be saved by pooling procurements, headquarters and capacities and better planning, a huge sum of \$28 billion per year or \$280 billion in a decade. European forces still don't have enough of the needed capabilities that are key to modern missions, which could be financed by up 30 to 50 percent with saved cash by pooling and joint-procurement programs.

To be a reliable partner and member in and with NATO, the European nations need to coordinate their efforts and work together. Pooling and sharing within the EU is a must for strengthening the second pillar within NATO in times of limited defense spending.

A positive new approach started with a French-British Defense Cooperation Treaty in 2010. It may be extended with more bilateral planning, including Germany or Poland. Additionally, U.S. procurements should be checked for better transatlantic programs and cost savings.

The Eurocorps with six nations could be expanded and used as a mobile Headquarters for a European Intervention Force in conflicts like Mali or Libya.

Actions rather than more vice words are needed now in Europe's member states of the EU and NATO.

Conclusion

A fresh NATO 3.0 depends on sufficient and modern defense capabilities, which must be preserved and funded adequately, especially in all European countries. In times of restrained funding, it uses creativity and a steady reform process with a modern smart defense structure to produce the maximum (defense efficiency) with the limited resources (of cash). Without this, the NATO shell will lack a core and the forces of progress would be naked and defenseless, with provocative weaknesses in a demanding world. Only a politically strong and coherent NATO with adequate military and non-military capabilities can credibly deter aggression, contain threats, prevent and respond effectively to crises and thus be a lasting and high lighthouse of freedom and for peace and stability.

NATO 3.0 rests on the basis of the classic policy of power and national interests, but continues its development in a globalized world with new risks, dangers and threats. It provides a link between the indispensable hard factors and the important, manifold, and often overlooked soft factors of crisis response and peace-making aimed at tailored, innovative double strategies for peace and liberty. It uses adaptable long-term planning, including all elements of best practices, timing and funding, to enable NATO countries to use military forces in interventions if required., where it promotes a double approach of power and reconciliation. It is a smart forward defense and flexible response in its use of all soft factors and the best practices of peacemaking by active and engaged foreign affairs and the development policies of the nations involved.

NATO can no longer be successful with mere case-by-case short-term crisis management. Its members need to be proactively shaping realities instead of adjusting to them and acting too late when the costs in lives and resources are at their peak. This is one lesson learned from Afghanistan.

NATO 3.0 activates the new global elites for responsible improvement of the world in all areas based on the moral foundation of the UN Charter and human rights. Its additional instruments are global networks, knowledge transfer through mentoring programs, creativity, passion, promotion of the human Codes of Tolerance and Respect (see www.codesoftolerance.com), the containment of radicals, improved planning and control, as well as the large commitment of leaders and individuals.

This newly-designed *NATO 3.0* policy is creative, preventative, action-oriented, extensive, cost-minded, cooperative and profound. It combines political determination with adequate capabilities for engagement as required.

Let's start this process now in all NATO member countries to safe peace and liberty in the 21st century for the next generation.

* This paper of as special task force of the World Security Network is a summary of different ideas and proposals for a fresh reform of NATO from nine member countries to make the alliance stronger as *NATO 3.0*. Main contributors are: Dr Hubertus Hoffmann (Founder and President World Security Network), LtGen ret. and U.S. Ambassador ret. Edward L. Rowny (President Ronald Reagan's chief negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms), LtGen ret Dr Klaus Olshausen (Chairman Clausewitz Association), MajGen ret. Sir Sebastian Roberts (former Commander of the Queen's Household Division), Vice Admiral ret. Charles Style (former Commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies in London), LtGen ret. Dr Ulf von Krause, Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (Professor International Relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey), Géza Jeszenszky (Foreign Minister of Hungary 1990-94), Tunne Kelam (Member European Parliament; Freedom Hero of Estonia), U. S. Navy Rear Admiral ret Dr David K. Shimp, Prof. Umberto Gori (President Center of Strategic, International and Entrepreneurial Studies, University of Florence), Richard Nunneley (Member of the International Advisory Board), LtGen ret Götz Gliemerth (former Commander ISAF), BrigGen ret. Dieter Farwick (Senior Vice President World Security Network), Henning-Hubertus Baron von Steuben (Member of the International Advisory Board), Przemyslaw Aleksander Schmidt (Member of the International Advisory Board), Fabrizio Bozzato (Editor Italy) and Leonard Wessendorff (Director World Security Network)- The World Security Network Foundation is an independent global network promoting a fresh foreign and security policy we name *World 3.0*-- See more at www.worldsecuritynetwork.com and www.codesoftolerance.com or on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter. Contact: hubertus@worldsecuritynetwork.com.

Footnotes:

¹ Klaus Naumann, Lord Peter Inge, John Shalikashvili, Jacque Lanxade, Henk an den Breemen, *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, Noaber Foundation, Lunteren NL, December 2007

² *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World*, p. 124

³ Proposals by Carl von Clausewitz in: *On War*, Howard/Paret edition, p. 708

⁴ *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World*, p. 131

⁵ Proposal by German Bundestag MPs Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff and Roderich Kiesewetter: *Impulse für Europas Sicherheitspolitik. Die Zeit zum Handeln ist gekommen (Impuls for European Security Policy – Time to Act)*, Sep/Oct 2012, p. 97

⁶ The World Bank, *Military Expenditure, 2011*

⁷ Maren Leed and Heather Conley, CSIS, Washington DC, June 2013, *NATO in the Land of Pretend*

French Statements on NATO 3.0

Hereafter, a fresh French view on NATO 3.0 by Admiral ret. Pierre Lacoste (former Director DGSE) and Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq (Chief Editor *Revue Défense Nationale*), through the « other NATO language » ; both are strategists and member of the Académie de marine in Paris.

Admiral ret. Pierre Lacoste:

Pour ma part, après avoir rappelé que je n'ai plus eu, depuis 23 ans de contacts professionnels avec l'OTAN, je ferai quelques observations générales pour souligner la perte de prestige et de confiance des peuples et des gouvernants de l'Alliance Atlantique envers les Etats-Unis.

Les derniers épisodes en date soulignent les incroyables erreurs américaines vis à vis de la Syrie. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent leur principal ennemi, Al Qaida et ils favorisent le démantèlement d'un des derniers Etats-Nations du Moyen Orient. C'est une autre « libanisation » après la destruction de l'Irak ; c'est un nouvel échec du « nation building » après leurs déboires en Afghanistan.

Leur soutien aux « Frères musulmans » est incompréhensible : les événements de l'été en Tunisie, et surtout en Egypte, ont démontré leur perversité et leur dangerosité. Nos difficultés au Mali, après les conséquences négatives de la dissémination des groupes et des armes en Libye, démontrent qu'il ne faut pas se tromper d'ennemi et que les plus dangereux sont toujours là.

Sur le plan des stratégies militaires, le choix traditionnel des hautes technologies a entraîné quelques succès tactiques, général mais leurs conséquences politiques sont déplorables. Certes les drones ont éliminé quelques responsables mais des milliers de martyrs volontaires sont prêts à les remplacer. Enfin et surtout, les redoutables enjeux logistiques du retrait d'Afghanistan, vont coûter des milliards de dollars pour rapatrier les immenses stocks mis en place pendant la plus longue guerre de l'histoire des Etats-Unis.

Bref je veux souligner que la machinerie de l'OTAN est archaïque et condamnée à terme par le retrait et par les incohérences des Etats-Unis. Dès lors que l'ex première puissance politique et économique mondiale est désavouée par les peuples de l'Occident démocratique, les aspects « surréalistes » de cette énorme organisation et, plus concrètement, de la prochaine réunion de Berlin frappent les observateurs de bon sens ».

Rear Admiral ret Jean Dufourcq:

J'ai passé cinq années dans une position intégrée dans une structure l'OTAN (Naples, Rome) et quatre années au service de l'Union européenne et de sa PCSD (Bruxelles). Elles m'ont inspiré les réflexions suivantes.

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide il y a 20 ans, l'OTAN hésite entre trois postures : une union stratégique défensive des démocraties construites sur le modèle occidental, un opérateur stratégique offensif

capable de former, doter, entraîner et conduire des coalitions larges pour des actions de sécurité à l'échelle de la planète ou un instrument polymorphe qui s'adapte de sommet en sommet aux tensions du monde et aux « modes » occidentales (RMA, DCI, MD, Comprehensive approach, Smart defense ...). Faute de choix, c'est cette dernière option pragmatique qui prévaut. Faute de vision commune aux Américains et aux Européens, c'est la vision américaine, la plus construite car fondée sur les seuls intérêts américains qui s'impose dans l'OTAN. Cette hésitation et cette tendance a désagrégé progressivement le ciment de l'Alliance qui était celui des démocraties unies pour la liberté face au défi soviétique. L'affaire syrienne le démontre aisément.

Il ne faudrait donc pas que la dynamique NATO 3.0 continue d'ignorer la dualité atlantique pour ne mettre en place qu'une vision stratégique américano centrée : un dispositif antimissiles à vocation mondiale avec un cœur dans les Rocheuses et des rampes AMB à la périphérie européenne et est-asiatique ; une cyberdéfense pilotée de façon couverte par un cœur de la NAS pilotant un centre d'excellence de l'OTAN et un dispositif coordonné de forces spéciales alliées capables de porter des coups à distance stand off (notamment via des drones armés) partout où les intérêts occidentaux sont en danger. Cette approche isolationniste, et punitive dans l'esprit, qui enrôle les nations alliées dans une stratégie type de puissance maritime ignore la réalité géopolitique de l'autre partie européenne de l'Alliance. Celle-ci est centrée sur la réalité continentale de l'Europe articulée sur ses périphéries essentielles ; euratlantique, euroméditerranéenne et euroasiatique. Cette réalité exige et dessine une stratégie ouverte de coopération régionale essentielles pour la stabilité et la sécurité du heartland qui continuent d'être la clé d'équilibre du monde. L'Europe stratégique ne peut se contenter d'être le contrefort oriental d'un continent américain, cœur de la sécurité du monde occidental, pas plus que l'Asie de l'Est ne peut se contenter d'être le contrefort occidental de ce même continent américain. C'est à une articulation

polycentrique du monde que la stratégie américaine doit se conformer et qu'elle doit favoriser avec la transformation de l'OTAN, si l'on veut sauver cette superstructure militaire construite par les peuples de la liberté, il y a plus de 50 ans.

Dans le monde qui vient, il n'ya plus de place pour l'OTAN d'hier même avec la Smart défense ni pour le leadership américain sur la sécurité du monde, même au nom d'une conception libérale et coopérative de la sécurité.

Références bibliographiques des travaux de l'amiral Jean Dufourcq (www.defnat.com):

I. La place de l'Alliance atlantique ; RDN été 2012 ; (extrait)

... Diagnostic

La vérité est que nous sommes depuis 20 ans bien embarrassés avec l'Alliance atlantique et son organisation militaire, l'Otan, et que nous cherchons sans beaucoup de succès la place à lui donner dans nos entreprises de sécurité et de défense d'un côté, et celles de développement et gouvernance de l'autre. Faute d'avoir pu redéfinir une vision commune et structurante de celles-ci, nous développons des projets successifs pour échapper à cette probable réalité de la péremption des alliances militaires au XXI^e siècle. Nous hésitons d'ailleurs souvent dans ces projets à répétition entre deux axes potentiels de développement dont l'articulation est plus que problématique. Le premier, géopolitique a conduit à des élargissements successifs sur une base de continuité continentale pour laquelle l'Otan a enrôlé l'Union européenne en l'entraînant vers l'Asie

centrale mais en prenant bien soin de contourner et de confiner la Russie. Le second, fonctionnaliste et d'essence anglo-américaine a cherché à rassembler la famille des démocraties libérales par-delà les frontières dans une forme de coopération occidentaliste capable de confiner les puissances émergentes, notamment en Asie. Mais force est de constater que cette double dynamique n'a pas su recréer une nouvelle identité pour l'Alliance et une nouvelle utilité pour l'Otan.

C'est aussi qu'après la disparition du système soviétique, la gestion de ses restes a été longue et complexe, notamment du fait de la dissémination nucléaire qu'il fallait encadrer, de la réunification européenne qu'il fallait organiser et de la gestion des Etats issus de la Yougoslavie qu'il fallait stabiliser puis viabiliser. Elle a imposé dix ans d'activités politico-militaires intenses pour l'Alliance auxquels ont succédé 10 ans de reconstitution d'une relation avec un pouvoir russe renoué en 2000 et qui est loin d'être un partenaire facile. Quant à l'épiphénomène tragique du terrorisme international qui a, pendant cette même dernière décennie, occupé passablement les esprits de l'Alliance et même failli devenir sa raison d'être, il a débouché en 2011, après de multiples opérations en coalition plutôt infructueuses, sur les printemps arabes qui vont désormais polariser l'attention de tous les alliés, pour des raisons bien différentes d'ailleurs selon le bord de l'atlantique où l'on vit.

1991 et 2001 sont deux points tournants stratégiques pour les alliés nord-américains ; 1991 et 2011, leurs équivalents pour les alliés européens. Distorsion réelle des perceptions.

Aujourd'hui l'Alliance prend peu à peu conscience de la divergence des destinées des alliés atlantiques : les Etats-Unis repositionnent ostensiblement leur puissance militaire de part et d'autre de l'Asie-Pacifique et les Européens gèrent à leur façon si déconcertante leur espace régional en semblant renoncer à la puissance militaire collective. Les peuples libres signataires du traité de Washington de 1949 ont bien évolué depuis et leur alliance défensive contre l'ennemi

soviétique ne les rassemble plus dans le même effort. Quel ciment peut-il rester dans ces conditions pour l'Otan et ses nations ? La menace Sud fut un temps un succédané possible, vite remplacé par la guerre globale contre le terrorisme et la promotion de la démocratie dans le « grand moyen orient ». L'obsession américaine d'invulnérabilité mise à mal par le 11 septembre reprend du service depuis deux sommets sous la forme d'un bouclier antimissile global capable de fédérer les alliés et de leur faire retrouver les vertus de la cohésion atlantique. On en parlera encore longtemps.

On voit bien que c'est la raison d'être de l'Alliance qui pose aujourd'hui problème. Non que le statu quo fondé sur l'adaptation réactive de sommet en sommet ne puisse encore durer quelques années mais plutôt parce que la grande crise économique dans laquelle tous les alliés sont désormais engagés multiplie les compétitions entre eux. Elle fait retrouver à chacun les ressorts de l'action des Etats qui forment l'Alliance atlantique, ces ressorts essentiels qui font éclater les solidarités et révèlent les différences de posture entre nations. Car tous les Etats alliés ont la charge première de défendre les intérêts et les valeurs des nations ou des peuples qu'ils incarnent et d'assumer les responsabilités que l'histoire et la géographie leur ont dévolues. Et ce, bien avant toute injonction de l'Alliance qui les lie. Là est aussi le fondement de leur légitimité. Mais les temps des crises actuelles les éprouvent.

Voilà pourquoi sans doute plutôt que de regarder en face les distorsions d'une alliance atlantique dont les différentes nations sont de moins en moins capables de définir le projet commun en raison de leurs destinées distinctes, on exécute les missions définies militaires définies par le plus résolu qui regroupe autour de lui une coalition que l'Otan soutient, comme en Irak, en Afghanistan ou récemment en Libye. Ou on se réfugie dans les délices éprouvés des cuisines technocratiques habituelles : réforme de la structure territoriale de l'Otan, modernisation du siège, financements communs des

opérations, injonctions capacitaires, relations Otan-UE, déclinaisons Berlin+ ou même Berlin + inverse, en oubliant au passage la dissymétrie des deux organisations, l'Otan et l'Union européenne condamnées à coopérer malgré leurs finalités si distinctes. Mais cette façon de temporiser est sans doute la seule qui vaille en l'absence d'une vision d'ensemble de l'avenir.

Combien de temps cela peut-il durer encore?

Projections:

Pour sortir d'une impasse qui se confirme et annonce une fin probable et tirer parti de la nouvelle position française au sein de l'Otan, on peut esquisser ici quelques pistes nouvelles capables de redonner une place utile à l'Alliance atlantique dans les nouveaux équilibres qui se dessinent sur la planète et dont on peut penser qu'ils se stabiliseront dans 20 ou 30 ans lorsque la transition démographique mondiale arrivera à son terme.

La thèse exposée ici sort des sentiers battus mais elle n'est pas nouvelle. Elle a déjà fait l'objet de suggestions régulières dans cette revue ; elle est que les instruments résiduels pertinents de l'Alliance doivent désormais être mis au service d'une émancipation stratégique européenne permettant un rééquilibrage géostratégique du continent. L'Otan en serait la matrice et en constituerait l'héritage. A la logique transatlantique d'hier qui assujettissait étroitement l'Europe aux visions stratégiques américaines doit succéder demain un nouveau partenariat euro-américain élargi en Atlantique, une nouvelle responsabilité continentale de l'Europe assortie de nouveaux partenariats euro-méditerranéens et eurasiatiques. Ces partenariats à approfondir viendraient équilibrer les démarches américano-asiatiques qui se dessinent de plus en plus fortement sous le président Obama consacrant le moindre intérêt américain pour l'Europe.

C'est le bon moment de réaliser cette émancipation stratégique.

Ainsi répartie, déclinée et démultipliée, l'Alliance atlantique pourrait s'effacer en quelques décennies pour permettre cette mutation vers de nouveaux partenariats régionaux mutuellement favorables et structurants. Ces nouveaux champs de coopération ou d'alliance préfigureraient la nouvelle réalité stratégique qui se profile à 20 ou 30 ans d'une planète de 9 milliards d'habitants dont seuls 10 à 12% appartiendront à ce qui constitue le noyau actuel de l'Alliance. La société mondiale ainsi rééquilibrée pourrait en effet s'organiser en 6 ou 7 grandes zones de plus d'1 milliard d'habitants qui vivraient dans la même dynamique de développement humain et économique et assureraient leur sécurité selon des modalités certes voisines mais plus homogènes et en phase directe avec leur histoire, leur culture et leurs économies.

C'est un devoir d'y veiller tant Otan, UE et Etats développés sont fragilisés.

Faute de savoir formuler des propositions constructives et de pouvoir développer des pistes courageuses, les Etats suivent complaisamment les penchants égoïstes ou corporatistes de leurs administrés et sont bien peu capables de leur proposer aujourd'hui de nouvelles frontières permettant d'exprimer leurs génies propres et de libérer leurs forces productives.

A défaut de cette dévolution à l'Europe émancipée des principaux héritages de l'Otan (dont les Européens ont été et restent après tout les actionnaires majoritaires) sur la base d'une vision à long terme réaliste et audacieuse, l'Alliance atlantique ne peut plus que périlcliter dans un occidentalisme défensif qui la conduira à s'opposer au mouvement inéluctable du monde ou dans une posture d'attentisme improductif qui finira par la marginaliser.

De même faute d'une émancipation stratégique résolue, l'Union européenne pourrait se désagréger et perdre l'une de ses raisons d'être décisive, l'organisation d'une communauté de destin et d'intérêt en

lieu et place des antagonismes tragiques que les nationalismes et les idéologies avaient suscités au cours des siècles précédents.

Il y a donc nécessité urgente sortir de l'Alliance de l'ornière actuelle.

Actions:

Forts de cette analyse radicale mais réaliste et conscients de la nécessité de cesser de tourner autour du point moyen d'une alliance atlantique que les réalités stratégiques du XXI^e siècle invalident progressivement, cherchons quels seraient les points tournants qui permettraient d'aborder de façon décisive la mutation de l'Alliance.

Contentons-nous de les énoncer, chacun mériterait pourtant un long développement.

L'émancipation stratégique de l'Union européenne passe par la mise en place d'une Commission stratégique euro-américaine en lieu et place du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord qui associe le gouvernement des Etats-Unis, le Conseil européen et ses instances pertinentes. En quelque sorte, une Alliance globale sans Otan. Une structure de coopération globale et sans priorité affichée aux questions de défense qui ne sont plus l'ultima ratio du XXI^e siècle.

L'émancipation militaire de l'Union européenne passe par la prise du contrôle politique et de la direction stratégique de Shape par les Européens et son abonnement principal aux opérations de la PCSD. Ni les préventions britanniques, ni les chantages turcs ne doivent faire renoncer à cette européanisation du QG opérationnel de l'Otan. Elle passe aussi par l'articulation soignée de l'AED et du Shape rénové afin de redonner à la question des capacités une dimension européenne raisonnable et cohérente, en phase avec ce que les Européens sont décidés à consacrer à leur défense, c'est à dire de l'ordre de 1% de leur richesse. Souvent dénoncé pour la modicité de cet effort et la lâcheté qu'il révélerait, cette modeste militarisation de la posture collective européenne n'est pourtant pas incohérente avec l'analyse de

la menace que font les Européens et les responsabilités qu'ils sont disposés à endosser collectivement. Ce que font et feront les Etats-Unis en matière militaire correspond à leur culture de l'engagement international et n'a pas à entrer dans le jeu des comparaisons ici. Leur posture militaire relève d'une autre ambition et d'une autre expérience stratégiques. En quelque sorte, promouvoir une Otan sans alliance, une structure militaire collective européocentrée sans prééminence américaine.

La densité stratégique de l'Atlantique et les enjeux de la coopération dans l'Atlantique Nord comme dans l'Atlantique Sud militent pour rechercher une nouvelle forme de dialogue atlantique incluant des pays aussi importants que le Mexique, le Brésil, l'Argentine, le Maroc ou l'Afrique du Sud. De nouvelles régulations stratégiques, notamment navales sont à imaginer pour organiser en Atlantique les échanges et les solidarités entre riverains et sécuriser le trafic maritime mondial. L'Atlantique dans son ensemble doit trouver une nouvelle cohérence stratégique en dehors de l'Alliance atlantique et tous ses riverains doivent y contribuer au Nord comme au Sud. Trois continents doivent trouver là une nouvelle structure de concertation stratégique qui permettra leur développement complémentaire et coordonné. En quelque sorte, organiser un Atlantique sans alliance ni Otan mais avec une nouvelle coopération tricontinentale, Amérique, Afrique, Europe.

Enfin, il faut considérer que le point d'équilibre stratégique du continent eurasiatique qui va de Brest à Vladivostok, de l'Atlantique au Pacifique est situé quelque part sur l'axe qui joint Paris à Moscou en passant par Berlin et Varsovie, car à l'Ouest de l'Oural ne vivent plus désormais que moins de 20% des 140 millions de Russes. Il faut aussi relever que le continent européen est à l'Ouest bordé par deux mers intérieures, la mer baltique et la mer méditerranée, qui définissent deux archipels directement associés au destin européen continental, l'archipel qui regroupe les îles britanniques et les pays

scandinaves au Nord, l'archipel qui comprend les pays d'Afrique du Nord séparés de l'Afrique noire par l'océan de sable du Sahara et sa rive du Sahel, au Sud. C'est une nouvelle approche collective de la masse continentale de l'Atlantique à l'Oural et du Cap Nord au Sahel qui permet de rendre compte d'une communauté humaine d'un milliard d'habitants dont il faut préparer la communauté de destin et d'intérêt au sein d'une planète nouvelle de 9 milliards d'habitants.

Voilà ce que permet de promouvoir une émancipation européenne sur la base de la dynamique entretenue jusqu'ici par l'Otan et dont il faut désormais infléchir le cours.

*

C'est sans doute à une alliance euro-asiatique qu'il faut se préparer à long terme pour gérer de nouveaux voisinages avec l'Afrique et l'Asie en bonne intelligence avec un continent américain dont la prééminence se relativise et les intérêts s'éloignent d'Europe. Cette alliance euro-asiatique fera le pendant au partenariat américano-asiatique que promeut l'actuelle administration américaine. C'est en se métamorphosant pour permettre ces évolutions progressives que l'Alliance atlantique trouvera une place, un prolongement utile, plutôt qu'en définissant de nouveaux concepts, de nouveaux partenariats et en poussant à de nouvelles intégrations de plus en plus improductives et de moins en moins acceptables.

La place que la France occupe aujourd'hui dans l'Otan ne doit pas l'assujettir au consensus de façade qu'affichent les alliés traditionnellement alignés sur la protection américaine. Sa position singulière au cap occidental du continent européen, son engagement ancien en Méditerranée et en Afrique, l'autorité indiscutable que lui confèrent ses outre-mers et sa responsabilité permanente au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU la désignent pour constituer l'avant-garde de la réflexion stratégique euroatlantique. Aujourd'hui comme hier, son talon d'Achille reste son aptitude pédagogique, sa force de conviction,

sa capacité à enrôler ses voisins et partenaires dans une telle entreprise de grande ampleur.

Aujourd'hui comme hier, la sécurité du continent européen et la construction d'une forte personnalité politique européenne passe par un dialogue responsable et ambitieux entre Londres, Paris et Berlin et la capacité de ces trois grands Etats à définir un modèle viable et convainquant de puissance européenne pérenne qui entraîne les autres alliés européens et rassure les alliés nord-américains. ///

II. Le paradoxe militaire européen- RDN été 2013 (extraits)

... Une plus grande Europe, résolument géopolitique et non plus fonctionnelle

La démarche européenne est, on le sait, double depuis l'origine, une réponse et un pari. La réponse, c'est celle qu'il fallait donner à un long passé tragique de guerres intestines en Europe par affrontement des nationalismes, une affirmation « du plus jamais cela, 1914 et 1940 », ce suicide collectif des Européens. Quant au pari, il stipulait que l'intérêt général collectif allait l'emporter sur tous les intérêts particuliers nationaux, la Commission européenne était chargée d'y veiller. Il ne fait pas de doute que la réponse apportée depuis les années 1960 a été convaincante et que la conflictualité intra européenne a désormais cédé la place de façon durable à une coopération, certes compétitive mais globalement bénéfique. Mais il est plus hasardeux de penser que le pari de l'intérêt collectif a été gagné, la posture communautaire n'ayant guère convaincu en imposant d'une part, une forme de concurrence qui divise et oppose, et d'autre part, en s'attachant à dénationaliser les postures politiques, économiques et sociales, tout en restant à la

périphérie du patriotisme européen et de la souveraineté collective. L'impasse est aujourd'hui avérée.

Pour en sortir, certains sont tentés d'affaiblir encore les Etats et de distribuer un peu plus leurs responsabilités régaliennes dans des structures transversales administrant les bonnes pratiques fonctionnalisées de systèmes multinationaux éprouvés. Cette vision utilitariste substitue aux Etats et à leurs principes constitutifs des organes transversaux vus comme nécessairement vertueux car articulés sur la défense et le partage des biens communs de la planète. Mais cette philosophie politique qui tire sa légitimité de l'économie mondialisée s'oppose à l'histoire des peuples européens en éclipsant leurs identités. Le vieux continent européen ne peut y souscrire car ceux qui le constituent ont une autre expérience sociopolitique. On ne pourra forger aucune personnalité européenne, créer aucun patriotisme européen, disposer aucun système européen de sécurité, si l'on met de côté l'histoire, la géographie et la culture des peuples européens, et leur expérience stratégique.

L'histoire nous a appris qu'aucune nation européenne ne pouvait exercer durablement de leadership sur les autres sans occasionner de guerre régionale ou mondiale. La géographie nous montre que si l'Europe n'a d'autres vraies frontières qu'humaines, la Méditerranée comme la Baltique en sont des mers intérieures qui relient un fort noyau continental, courant de l'Atlantique à l'Oural, à un archipel européen, britanno-scandinave au Nord, nord-africain au Sud. La culture des Européens est, quant à elle, une lente distillation d'un héritage gréco-latin, germano-slave, sémito-chrétien, transcendé par les Lumières en une pratique sociopolitique commune. Telle est le vrai ciment européen.

Partant de là, les Européens doivent aujourd'hui démontrer qu'ils sont capables de se mettre d'accord sur un projet de puissance qui leur soit propre, une vision de l'avenir qui les caractérise et un

cadre géostratégique et géoéconomique qui les distingue. L'Union européenne doit rassembler une famille au sens large, pas gérer un club d'actionnaires. Pour y parvenir, il nous faut sans doute viser une plus grande Europe, de l'Atlantique à l'Oural et du Cap Nord au Sahel. Elle rassemblera des Etats, pour la plupart nationaux et fédéraux, qui auront pris en main la destinée des peuples dont ils ont la charge. Et ce défi concernera bientôt 1 milliard d'habitants sur les 9 que comptera la planète à mi- siècle.

Une union plus souple, moins rigide, plus ouverte. Un format élargi, plus audacieux, plus en phase avec la mondialisation accélérée d'une planète qui compte aujourd'hui 7 milliards d'habitants mais dont la régionalisation s'accélère aussi autour de pôles hétérogènes d'un milliard et demi d'habitants, comme en Chine, en Inde, en Afrique. Des intégrations moins exigeantes permettent en effet à la fois de préserver une cohérence géopolitique et de prendre rang avec un ensemble d'un poids suffisant dans cette planète toujours en croissance.

Une telle formule de famille européenne élargie permettrait d'approfondir de multiples noyaux durs restreints, là où c'est possible : comme un cœur rhénan carolingien vraiment intégré, un espace hanséatique baltique et un ruban danubien restaurés, un bassin méditerranéen occidental régénéré, un archipel britannoscandinave et une connexion germano-slave mieux structurés, un espace slave rationalisé. Elle offrirait également au monde grand-russe la possibilité de revitaliser sa racine européenne et permettrait à une Eurasie rénovée de servir de pont et de tampon entre l'Europe blanche et l'Asie jaune, tout comme l'Euro-méditerranée devient peu à peu la passerelle et le sas entre l'Europe blanche et l'Afrique noire et l'Euroatlantisme préserve les intérêts communs historiques des Européens et des Américains. Il faut redonner à l'Europe à la fois sa centralité et sa souplesse

Ce qu'il faut sans doute, c'est un ensemble européen qui ne soit pas une forteresse assiégée mais un espace dont la diversité a été intégrée dans une architecture suffisamment flexible pour absorber et valoriser toutes les différences internes au service du développement. C'est une continuité énergétique sécurisée avec nos voisins slaves et asiatiques et une zone partagée de coprosperité économique avec nos voisins d'Afrique du Nord.

*

Ce dont nous avons besoin maintenant, c'est d'une sécurité collective des espaces européens, centrée sur des intérêts communs régionaux identifiés et non d'un bouclier anti-missile conçu ailleurs pour neutraliser une attaque hypothétique provenant d'un arc de crise dont la tragédie est d'abord socio-économique. Au sein de l'ensemble constitué, ce qu'il faut, c'est laisser s'agréger plus étroitement en noyaux homogènes ceux qui souhaitent fusionner leurs destins comme l'Allemagne et la France, c'est laisser coopérer militairement de façon étroite ceux qui le peuvent, comme la Grande Bretagne et la France l'ont décidé il y a deux ans ou se rassembler ceux qui veulent gérer un bassin d'intérêt commun comme les Latins et les Maghrébins tentent de le faire dans l'espace 5+5.

De l'espace hétéroclite actuel, en passant par une structure territoriale sécurisée, aller vers un vaste ensemble stratégique dont les différents noyaux durs constitueront l'ossature sécuritaire. Tel peut être un projet paneuropéen militaire. Moins une alliance selon les modèles du XIX^e et XX^e siècles qu'un partenariat fondé sur la proximité socio-historique et la communauté assumée de destin et d'intérêts.

This paper NATO 3.0 is dedicated to the memory of Dr Fritz Kraemer, Mentor, Missionary and Pentagon Strategist, who passed

away ten years ago and initiated the World Security Network Foundation together with Dr Hubertus Hoffmann in 2002.

- more in www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/fritzkraemer -