The Time Factor and Global Fragmentation: The Resilience of Democracies in War of Attrition
At the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara, discussions will focus on three main areas: increasing defence investments up to five percent of GDP, strengthening defence industry production, and continuing support for Ukraine. Lessons learned, based on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, send a clear message: winning the military modernization challenge is not enough if the problem of long-term political and industrial sustainability remains unsolved. Collective defence requires not only technologically superior weapons, but also institutions capable of resisting democratic fatigue, faster legislative channels to overcome political vetoes, and, above all, a resilient and flexible defence industrial base capable of countering the speed and mass of emerging autocratic coalitions. – By. Gustavo Scotti di Uccio – – AOS PGD[1]
The “Aid Fatigue” Syndrome and the Trap of Political Cycles
In wars of attrition, time is an asymmetrical resource. While authoritarian regimes can plan over multi-year horizons by ignoring internal dissent, Western democracies are inherently tied to electoral cycles and the mood of public opinion. As months go by, media interest inevitably drops, and economic and military support shifts from a moral imperative to a bipartisan battlefield.
Delays in legislative decision-making processes are not just bureaucratic hurdles; they are variables that extract an immediate price in blood on the battlefield. The political stalemate in Washington between late 2023 and early 2024 serves as a perfect case study: blocking a vital aid package in the US Congress for several months caused a dramatic shortage of artillery ammunition on the front lines. This logistical vacuum temporarily altered the tactical balance of power, proving that the most critical vulnerability of a democratic alliance often lies within its own domestic politics.
Overcoming “Taboos” and the Doctrine of Controlled Escalation
Another crucial policy dynamic concerns the management of escalation risk. Since the early stages of the conflict, NATO countries have operated under the constant fear of a wider war or a nuclear response from Moscow. This posture led to a “gradual” military supply strategy, marked by the progressive breaking of rigid political taboos. The evolution of aid shows a slow but steady transition from the purely defensive, short-range weapons supplied in 2022, such as Javelin and Stinger systems, to the subsequent delivery of heavy artillery like HIMARS. After long diplomatic negotiations, this support eventually expanded to include modern tanks, Patriot air defence batteries, long-range missiles, and finally, F-16 fighter jets. While this gradual approach prevented a direct conflict between nuclear powers, it also highlighted the limits of a policy that often provides the tools needed not to lose, but with timelines that are too stretched out to allow for a decisive strategic victory.
The Rise of the Axis of Denial: Autocratic Flexibility vs. Western Slowness
While the West debates internally over rules of engagement and budgets, hostile geopolitical actors challenging the US-led global order have shown a surprising capacity for integration and quick movement. We have witnessed the birth of a true “axis of denial” and sanctions evasion, capable of directly challenging NATO’s supply chains.
The massive influx of Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, along with the subsequent opening of joint production plants on Russian soil, and the transfer of millions of artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea represent a turning point. These clandestine bilateral agreements prove that autocratic systems, even when isolated, manage to mobilize their war economies and convert obsolete or sanctioned industrial resources into mass assets. Furthermore, they do so at a faster speed than Western market economies, which have not yet fully transitioned to large-scale defence industrial production.
Managing Concurrent Crises and Strategic Diversion
Finally, global military policy must deal with resource scarcity and the limited strategic attention span of major powers. No geopolitical theatre exists in a vacuum, and the outbreak of new crises acts as a powerful diversion.
The explosion of hostilities in the Middle East starting in October 2023 inevitably fragmented the international political agenda and split logistical priorities. Crucial air defence systems and government funds had to be divided across multiple fronts. In parallel, persistent tensions in the Western Pacific and the Taiwan Strait force the United States into a constant balancing act regarding its strategic stockpiles of ammunition and advanced technologies. The core lesson for policymakers is that international stability cannot be managed in isolation, as the proliferation of concurrent crises risks pushing prolonged wars of attrition into a psychological and material background, favouring the long-term strategy of the aggressors.
A Clear Message
Recent lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict send a clear message: winning the military modernization challenge is not enough if the problem of long-term political and industrial sustainability remains unsolved.
Collective defence requires not only technologically superior weapons, but also institutions capable of resisting democratic fatigue, faster legislative channels to overcome political vetoes, and, above all, a resilient and flexible defence industrial base capable of countering the speed and mass of emerging autocratic coalitions.
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[1] AOS is an Independent company registered in Belgium since 2012. It delivers strategic analysis, technical, engineering, operational and management support for defence and security sector at national, European & transatlantic levels. In last 5 years, AOS has carried out more than 80 NATO studies and EU projects in strategy, interoperability, emerging technologies, air defence, energy management, UAVs, & dual-use solutions. AOS team consists of senior managers & engineers from Belgium, the Cz. Rep., France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal & Spain with extensive experience in defence industries, Ministries of Defence, and EU institutions
